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PREFACE 
One of the aims of systems analysts is to  develop tools for decision makers who must 
deal with problems in which there are many interacting elements. Marcel Brus, a student 
in international law of the University of Leiden, examined the applicability of systems 
analysis t o  international legal research as part of the 1988 Young Summer Scientist Pro- 
gram within the Transboundary Air Pollution Project. A special look was taken a t  the 
Regional Acidification Information and Simulation (RAINS) model. The conclusion in this 
report is that  systems analysis certainly help to  identify important elements of the prob- 
lem, but the analysis must consider not only judical but scientific and social issues as well. 
Bo R. Doos 
Leader 
Environment Program 
Roderick W. Shaw 
Leader 
Transboundary Air Pollution 
Project 
ABSTRACT 
This report investigates the usefulness of systems analysis as a methodological tool 
for the analysis of the world legal system. Due to increasingly complex relations between 
states, traditional methods for legal analysis are no longer sufficient to provide adequate 
explanations of the changing features of international legal regulation. Systems analysis 
offers the opportunity to combine methods used in legal and social sciences and, more- 
over, to focus on the dynamics of international law development. The development of a 
regime for the prevention of long range transboundary air pollution in Europe serves as a 
case study. 
In the report three levels of analyses are distinguished: (a) a theoretical level con- 
cerned with the general legal and political theories explaining the international behaviour 
of states; (b) a policy making level dealing with international (legal) cooperation in prac- 
tice, i.e. the process of acceptance of specific international rules; and (c) an instrumental 
level which deals with specific techniques and technologies used to facilitate the policy 
and law making process and, for example, to supervise the behaviour of states and to en- 
force international agreements. Examples are (satellite) monitoring techniques and the 
use of integrated computer models like the RAINS model developed at IIASA. 
The first two levels of analyses receive most attention in this report. The main con- 
clusion is that systems analysis forms a promising methodology to be used in legal sci- 
ence. However, more extensive research remains necessary. 
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SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AN INQUIRY INTO ITS  APPLICATION.^ 
When I was invited by the International Institute ,of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) to take part in their Young Scientist Summer Program (YSSP), I had no 
idea what was meant with 'applied systems analysis'. I have to admit, even today I 
would not be able to give a clear definition of this phrase. Nevertheless, as the 
choice of the title suggests, I have at least some ideas about systems analysis and I 
even accepted the challenge of taking a look at its application, although I realized 
only recently, almost half a year after my stay in Laxenburg, that I was analyzing a 
system and even to my surprise I was trying to apply this systems analysis to the 
practice of international law. 
One of the reasons for this delay in enlightenment was the fact that I tried to 
reconcile a discussion on two essentially different systems. The question which 
IIASA asked me to do some research on concerned the use of computer models in 
international diplomatic conferences. The computer model in question was the RAINS 
model (Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation) which is designed in order 
to facilitate international agreement on acid rain abatement. One possible approach 
would be to take a look at the application of such .a computer model in a very 
specific situation, i.e. the European attempts to stop further acidification. The 
computer model in this w e  is a simplified version of the complex European 
environmental system. The question then is: Is this simplified system acceptable for 
diplomats, or for decision makers in general, to perform as a basis for their 
decisions? Would they accept the result of a 'simulation game' in their negotiations, 
and if so, under what circumstances and to what extent? Thus, in this approach the 
system is the environmentaVecological system in Europe, represented in a computer 
model. 
The other approach takes a look at the way how international decision making 
works. The focus is not on the object of legal decision making, but on the process. 
If one can gain an insight into the particularities of international decision making, 
The author would like to thank all members of IIASA, the Transboundary Air 
Pollution Project (former Acid Rain Project) and especially Dr R.W. Shaw for their 
support and assistance during his stay in Laxenburg ,in the summer of 1988. This 
would not have been possible without the financial support of the Stichting IIASA 
Nederland (Foundation IIASA-Netherlands). 
this would of course be useful for the assessment of the possible use of newly 
developed tools like computer models. However, contrary to the first approach, the 
system under analysis is not the computer model, or the system it represents, but 
the international system in which states operate. World order as object of systems 
analysis. Conclusions with respect to the usefulness of a specific tool like RAINS 
can, as a result of this, only be of a general nature, but the 'world order approach' 
does provide a foundation for research into the more specific questions related to 
the use of models like RAINS. 
In the present study I will follow the second approach. This is therefore more a 
study of world order than of the application of computer models. Nonetheless, I will 
try to structure this research report in such a way that it not only deals with 
abstract questions regarding the process of decision making, but that it gradually 
comes down to a more concrete discussion of decision making with respect to 
a~ id~c a t i o n  and the use of the RAINS model. Since so many fundamental questions 
will be touched upon in this study, I do not seek completeness. This research report 
should be seen as an attempt to formulate questions which can become the basis for 
further research. Also, and this is a general problem for those trying to follow a 
interdisciplinary approach, it will not be possible to extensively discuss all elements 
considered relevant in a certain field of scientific study. Critique by specialists in 
these fields is therefore welcomed by the author. 
The title of this study is inspired by a recent attempt by two international 
lawyers to describe the actual crisis in (the methodology of) international legal 
thinking in terms of systems analysis.2 Although, in my opinion, the results of their 
approach remained rather meager, they at least identified the current problems in 
international law and provided the elements for further research. Contrary to their 
approach which is limited to the discussion of legal aspects, I will try to go beyond 
a purely legal discussion by taking into account the results from (international) 
political and policy science. Also, I will try to apply the results of the general 
analysis of the international system to a more concrete situation of environmental 
law making. Whether I will succeed remains to be seen. 
Kiss & Shelton, Systems Analysis of International Law: A Methodological Inquiry, 
XVII Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 45-74 (1986). See also Sorensen, 
Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Consi&rcrhcrhons to a Systems Analysis of 
International Orgcmisations in the World Legal Order, 32 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 559-576 (1983). 
As already suggested before, it is extremely difficult to define a system. I do not 
intend to embark upon this discussion, but as an illustration I will provide the 
definition given by Kiss and Shelton: "Systems are integrated wholes whose 
properties cannot de reduced to those of smaller units, entities whose whole is 
greater than the sum of its part".3 Systems are characterized by a dynamic 
interrelation between the elements of which they consist; by a dynamic balance 
maintained by positive and negative feedback mechanisms. In the international 
system, modem states are actors in an international web of relations; they can no 
longer be regarded as coexisting units that can fulfill their traditional functions and 
responsibilities unaided. The web of international relations has become an essential 
element in the existence of a state. The international (legal) system can no longer 
be understood on the basis of the study of (the behaviour of) individual states. "[A] 
systems approach .... reverses the structural construct of the international legal 
system by making as its foundation the entire international community/system, 
rather than building from the base of individuals ~ t a t e s . ~  
In their article Kiss and Shelton start with the observation that the general 
perception of international law is still based on the seventeenth century vision of 
the world existing of "sovereign states which should co-operate but which are 
masters of their own destiny and which do not need to take into consideration, 
unless they wish to, the interests of others and those of the world community." 
However, the world has changed, among others as a result of technological changes. 
The basis of international cooperation is no longer the purely voluntary act of a 
state to engage in international relations. Modern states are necessarily part of a 
larger system, both for reasons of guaranteeing its own existence (in economic 
terms for example) as well as for the fact that they can hardly close its borders 
for transnational influences of non-state actors such as multinational enterprises, 
terroristic organizations, international press agencies and of course individual human 
beings. Notwithstanding the enormous changes in this respect in the last decades, 
the approach to international law has remained essentially the same. This leads to a 
discrepancy between international legal thinking and the actual behaviour of states, 
which has to be overcome through the development of new concepts and a new 
approach to international law. The systems approach, based upon dynamic 
interrelationships, offers the necessary foundation. 
Kiss & Shelton, supra note 5 at 49. 
Id. at 68. 
Kiss and Shelton select three fields of international law to illustrate their point: 
human rights, the preservation of cultural property and the conservation of the 
environment. Since this study is concerned with environmental law, I will only 
comment upon this aspect of their study. 
Kiss and Shelton identify three particularities of environmental protection as a 
new field of international law its physical characteristics (the environment knows 
no frontier); economic considerations; and public opinion. It is clear to everyone 
who makes a study of international environmental law, that the traditional concepts 
of international law necessarily fail to provide the answers to the current problems. 
Transfrontier pollution cannot be dealt with solely on a basis of reciprocity, 
prohibitions and sanctions (basic concepts in 'traditional' international law), but 
must be encountered with international, perhaps even supranational cooperation and 
the creation of international programs of a global character in order to safeguard 
the common interest. However, Kiss and Shelton rightly raise the question who is to 
determine the common interest and in the name of what? 
The economic component of environmental law is also evident. The cost of anti- 
pollution measures may bring a competitive advantage upon those countries that do 
not take these measures. Also problems like the dumping of waste in developing 
countries, or the sale of products prohibited in the industrialized countries are 
examples of the economic component of the international pollution question. 
The third mentioned particularity is the role of the public opinion. In no other 
field has it become so evident as in international environmental matters that a 
public awareness exists that does not know of any frontier. In no other field of 
international relations (except perhaps with regard to the international arms race) 
so much public reaction is aroused, increasingly leading to effective pressure on 
governments to take action (this perhaps in contrast to the arms race). 
International (regional or global) legal rules are required to deal with the 
environmental problems: legal rules in a framework of an international law in which 
the problem and its solution are taken as a starting point and not the preservation 
of the sovereignty of the state. The development of such new legal rules is of 
course not only possible trough the work of lawyers and international diplomats. An 
interdisciplinary, 'holistic' approach, in which experts of all scientific disciplines 
cooperate, is needed. 
The systems approach, defined by a dynamic interaction between its component 
parts, implies a change in the static conception of international law and leads 
according to Kiss and Shelton to a dynamic conception of the role of law. The law 
is to be based upon the concept of the common interest of mankind, or in other 
words a world-wide value system. Consequence of this is that state sovereignty has 
to be considered in functional terms rather than absolute. The state of today is 
primarily - when viewed from within - a utilitarian institution, existing to ensure 
the basic needs of its citizens. As such the state should also be considered in 
functional terms in relation to its role in the international community. Where a 
state cannot individually perform certain tasks they Are obliged to cooperate: "In 
these cases States competences must be determined by the functions they can and 
wiU perform."5 International cooperation is inevitable and with this international 
institutionalization. International institutions, with the United Nations as a general 
meeting point and framework for action, are necessary to guarantee continuous 
cooperation in the fields where a permanent exchange of information, coordination 
of action etc. is required. 
The systems approach is not something remote from the observable practice of 
today. Especially in the field of environmental law, treaties already reflect the need 
for a different approach. These treaties, like the Convention on the Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (1973), are of a flexible character, allowing 
modifications of the terms of agreement whenever this is thought necessary for 
example on the basis of new scientific information. Also, modem treaties sometimes 
provide a kind of framework or program of action, like the Convention on Long- 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution or the Ozone Convention. Not only the form of 
the treaties has changed. Also the process of internatibnal law making is subject to 
change. Principles for international behaviour have been adopted by international 
organizations or conferences representing the entire international community. Such 
principles were in some instances transformed into binding obligations under 
international law at a later stage. "Clearly, such principles and their role in 
international life can only be really understood in the light of their ulterior 
development, when functions are taken into a~count."~ 
Kiss' and Shelton's approach is an interesting example of an attempt to find a 
concept of international law which both explains changes in international law that 
occur nowadays and also provides a foundation for the dynamic development of an 
international law based upon a common interest of mankind. A systems approach is 
useful in this respect, although their approach is in some instance of a too 
5 Id. 
ti Id. at 70. 
simplistic character. Their conclusion is an evident example of this. The statement 
that "a description of how modem international society functions supports 
recognizing that a global system exists" and that this "calls for revising the 
fundamental approach to international legal problems through redefining the role of 
States and international organisations in a functional, interdependent manner and 
accepting not only the need for, but the inevitability of, international law as one 
means of solving the growing list of transnational social problems" is of a 
disappointing generality and is not of a very practical value. The systems approach 
itself, nevertheless, offers an important starting point for further research of 
development of modem international law. It is along this line that the rest of this 
study will be undertaken. 
In my approach I distinguish at least two levels of analysis. (1) A theoretical 
level which is concerned with a more general explanation of the international 
behaviour of states. Especially changes in their behaviour as well as changes in the 
process of the formulation of new fundamental international rules and principles are 
important. In this respect, the direction of change is of utmost significance. 
Political as well as legal theoretical concepts, such as for example the concept of 
sovereignty or of common interest of mankind, will provide the basis for this part 
of my analysis. Chapter 11 will deal with these questions of theory building. 
(2) A second level of analysis is the policy making level. Policy making should be 
given a broad meaning in this respect. It refers to policy decisions and the process 
of reaching these decisions at an international level. This concerns, for example, the 
establishment of international environmental monitoring agency, but also the 
acceptance of specific international rules, often in the form of a formal treaty, for 
example concerning the abatement of acid rain.  his' latter form mght be called 
'legal policy making'. At this level we are interested in international cooperation in 
practice, both political and legal. (Chapters 111 and IV) 
(3) A possible third level that could be distinguished can be called the 
'instrumental' level. It is difficult however, to draw a sharp line between the policy 
making and the instrumental level. This third level is mainly concerned with policy 
control and law enforcement, but it is arguable whether this should be distinguished 
from policy making or the discussion on the basic concepts. One reason for a 
distinction would be the fact that in the international legal system law enforcement 
is still a very weak element. How can this be changed? Can, for example, modern 
technology, like international environmental monitoring with the help of satellites, 
be made instrumental to a system of legal responsibility and liability of states for 
damage caused to other states or to the international community in general? What 
would be the effects of these kind of technological changes for international 
cooperation? It will not be possible to deal with these questions in this study, 
although the discussion on the use of the RAINS model (in Chapter V) is a first 
step into this direction. 
As a central theme in this study, I will use the concept of 'international 
learning'. I have chosen to use this concept since I intend in this study to identify 
and, as far as possible, clanfy developments that show that the international system 
is a dynamic system indeed. One reason for this is the constant change in the 
perception of the system as a result of accumulation of knowledge about the world 
we live in. A continuous learning process exists - sometimes it is an extremely slow 
process, since it takes time and especially interest of those involved, to accept and 
integrate new knowledge into new policies. Sometimes the process is fast, for 
example as a result of an emerging 
Taking as a basic definition of learning "to alter one's beliefs as a result of new 
informationB or even simpler "reinterpreting one's interests"lO, makes clear that 
this touches upon the heart of the discussion on the emerging international system. 
The concept of learning can be helpful in answering questions like: How can the 
still prevalent view on international law and international relations, with absolute 
state sovereignty as its foundation, be adjusted to the needs of today in which the 
Keohane & Nye, Two Cheers for Multifateralism, 60 Foreign Policy 148-167 
(1985); Cf. the example of the Chernobyl disaster and the speedy adoption of two 
IAEA treaties; The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (opened 
for signature 26 September 1986, entered into force on 27 October 1986), reprinted 
in 25 International Legal Materials (hereinafter I.L.M.) 1370 (1986); The Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a nuclear Accident or .Radiological Emergency (also 
opened for signature on 26 September 1986, entered into force on 26 February 
1987), mphted in 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986). See, e.g., A.O. Adede, The IAEA 
Notitication and Assistance Conventions in Case of a Nuclear Acident; Landmarks in 
the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process 134 (1987); Cameron, Nucleur Safety After 
Chernobyl: The Role of International Law, 1 Leiden Journal of International Law 
121-135 (1988). 
Keohane & Nye, supra note 8. 
lo Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, 23 World 
Politics 370 (1980). 
national interest has in fact become dependent on a common international interest? 
In this respect we can follow Prof. Ernst B. Haas' suggestion that 
"learning has taken place when actors adopt new rules of behavior that make 
use of new information and knowledge, or adopt ways for the search for such 
knowledge .... New knowledge, then, is used to redefine the content of 
national interest. Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted effects 
usually results in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to 
alter one's ends."" 
An important aspect of stimulating international cooperation and promoting the 
awareness of international interdependence is therefore the channeling of available 
information (in a usable form) to institutions and decision makers who are 
responsible with respect to a certain issue, like environmental management. This is 
all the more important because of the complexity of most of the current 
international problems. No individual can acquire all the factual and scientific 
knowledge about these problems. Yet, policies will have to be adopted, built upon 
this imperfect knowledge. Therefore, flexible international structures are needed to 
provide a framework in which the learning process of states (and for this matter 
the individuals and institutions of which a state consists) can take place. 
Again, it remains to be seen whether it will be possible to discuss all the 
elements I mentioned in this introduction (and all the elements I have in mind but 
did not mention) in one research report and whether I will succeed in bringing 
these together in a more or less consistent whole. However, whatever the result 
may be, the challenge was too great not to at least give it a try. 
2 BASIC CONCEPrS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
21. Building bridges 
In this chapter I will try to join concepts used in international political theory with 
international legal concepts. Although these two fields of study cover to a large 
extent the same subject - the study of the international system - in scholarly 
writing they are usually treated separately. Of course, there are some valid reasons 
for this division, but if one wants to discuss the fundamental issues of the 
international community, a distinction between the two academic fields is not always 
very useful. 
'' Id. at 390. 
International legal rules and principles determine to a certain extent the 
behaviour of states (and other international actors), but the assertion that the 
development and implementation of these rules and principles is dependent on 
political structures and concepts, like the power distribution, is also correct. We are 
not dealing with two separated worlds, but with just one world in which the 
interconnectedness between politics and law (and in this respect especially law 
making) becomes more evident every day. 
The problem with c o m b i i  two academic disciplines that have been developing 
separately for some time, is that specific terminologies and theoretical approaches 
have been developed. These are not always easily linked together. However, an 
attempt to build bridges between international law and international politics might 
be useful for a better understanding of the prospects for change and especially the 
constraints on such change. 
International law is valuable in this respect since it provides information about 
the formalized structures of international cooperation, both in a normative sense 
and in an organizational sense. This structure incorporates, for example, general 
principles of international law @ucta sunt servanda), fundamental norms (a 
prohibition of genocide, respect for fundamental human rights, a ban on the use of 
force), and numerous treaties regulating all kind of aspects of international 
cooperation. Also of great importance are of course the institutional aspects: the 
law of international organizations; rules dealing with the formation of international 
law; and rules on sanctions and settlement of disputes.12 
Traditionally, international lawyers merely deal with the 'products'* (the 
principles, norms and rules) of international law, their application in a particular 
situation and the formal process of their development. Their interest is not in the 
first placed concerned with the "broader social, psychological, economic, and 
political factors responsible for the lawmaking and unmaking behavior of states"14. 
Of course, it cannot be denied completely that many lawyers are also interested in 
l2 Compare Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary 
rules lay down standards of behavior and rules of obligation. Secondary rules are 
mainly procedural and remedial. H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law (1%1). 
* Or the 'outcome aspect'. See Ahmed Sheikh, International Law and National 
Behavior; A Behavioral Interpretation of Contemporary International Law and 
Politics 310 (1974). 
l4 Id. at 308. 
the political aspects of the process of law making, especially since many lawyers 
take part in the process themselves, for example as members of national diplomatic 
delegations to international (law making) conferences. Nevertheless, they are 
primarily interested in the process since this can provide valuable information about 
the interpretation and implementation of legal instruments. 
On the other hand, political scientists are less interested in the formalized 
'products' of international cooperation. They are more interested in understanding 
the broader factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The explanation of state 
behaviour is their main concern. International law does not play a very important 
,' 
role in this respect. It is seen by most political scientists as but one aspect of the 
complex structure of international society. Especially in the traditionalist's view, 
international law, or the 'products' of international law, are not recognized as a 
highly relevant factor in the explanation of state behaviour. Other elements, such as 
the balance of military power or resource related capabilities, play a much more 
important role. Their main argument is often based on the absence of an 
international legislator and the fact that international law lacks the necessary 
coercive power, since no effective international enforcement authority exists. 
These political scientist are to a certain extent right in their skepticism with 
regard to the role of international law. International law has thus far not been able 
to regulate state behaviour in all its aspects. However, important changes in 
international relations have taken place in the recent decades, not only as the 
result of 'physical' changes like, among others, the decolonization, the increase in 
world trade, the introduction of nuclear arms, the threats to the natural 
environment, but also of a growing awareness of common human values, like the 
respect for civil and political human rights, the right to a decent minimum standard 
of living in the least developed countries and the right to a healthy natural 
environment. These changes call for a drastic increase in the role of international 
law and therewith for a change in perspective of both political scientists and 
international lawyers. 
International political scientist can contribute to the ins i i t  in the 'input aspect' 
related to the necessary changes.15 With the term 'input aspect' Sheikh refers to 
the various processes of international bargaining and consensus formation prior to 
deliberate law development through treaties and other formal agreements.16 
- -  - 
l5 Id. at 310. 
Id. 
However, we could broaden this concept somewhat by also including the motivational 
aspect of law observance.17 The question then is not only why and how legal norms 
are developed, but also, why states do obey most of these rules?18 
As already mentioned, in this chapter I intend to provide a theoretical 
framework for analysis by joining international political and legal theories. Of 
course, it is impossible to deal with all theories and all nuances of these theories as 
they have been developed in the past years. I therefore have to select (aspects of) 
those theories that seem most relevant for the present study. I will take theories of 
international relations as a point of departure. In the selection of these theories, 
three concepts were of central importance: complex interdependence, international 
regimes, and international learning. These concepts will be discussed, and where 
possible related to legal concepts. 
22 Complex interdependence 
In the modern study of world politics several approaches can be distinguished. First, 
the traditional approach in which 'power and security' plays a dominant role. This 
approach is often labelled as 'realism' or 'traditionalism'. Second, in a more recent 
approach, often called neorealism, this preoccupation with (military) power and 
security is diminished. More attention is paid to changes in the international society 
that decrease the assumed independence of states. The theory of 'complex 
interdependence' will be the main example of this approach. A third, radically 
different perspective for the study of world politics are offered by the 'dependency' 
theories. These focus upon the structural inequality between the dominant centres of 
economic and political power and the dependent periphery. 
Yet another approach, the so called 'postrealist' theory, can be distinguished as 
a new direction of research. This approach focusses on the development of 
normative values as the basis for international cooperation. Values like the concern 
for human rights and for the environment, the rejection of the use of weapons of 
l7 Although violations of international law by states attract most attention, Henkin 
is right when he states that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligation almost all of their time". Louis 
Henkin, How Nations Behave; Law and Foreign Policy 47 (26 ed. 1979). See also 
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 American Journal of 
International Law 705 (1988). 
l8 Perhaps this input aspect is to a certain extent comparable with Hart's 
'internal aspect' of law. H.LA. Hart, supra note 12. 
mass destruction as an acceptable political tool are of central importance in this 
view. It is perhaps even more closely related to the systems analysis approach, than 
I the other approaches. However, lack of time makes it impossible to incorporate a 
discussion on this postrealistic, or 'normativist' approach at this place. One 
important difference between the normativists and the present approach, however, I 
would like to mention. This is the fact that I will try not to take (subjective) 
values as a point of departure, as normativists do, but the necessity of international 
cooperation between states as a consequence of todays' global challenges. The basis 
for this cooperation has to be founded on the existing premisses of state 
sovereignty (as in the realist and neorealist theory). The, in my view, necessary 
adjustment of sovereignty (from absolute to functional sovereignty) and the fact 
that this coincides with the development of international common values, does not 
follow from a preoccupation with these values, but from the (objective) self interest 
of states. I will try to demonstrate with the discussion in the subsequent chapters 
on the development of international environmental management that these changes 
are indeed taking place. 
In this study I will only consider the first two approaches. Dependency theory 
deals predominately with the structure of global economic relations.19 Although this 
might clarify, for example, certain structural constraints for the adoption of 
effective environmental strategies in developing countries, it is clearly beyond the 
scope of this study. I have already explained the reason for not discussing 
postrealism. 
Bmic elements in realist theoly 
The realist theory of international relationsm is in the first place state centric. 
Sovereign states, not subject to any higher source of authority, are the main actors 
l9 See, e.g., A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: 
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (1971); J. Galtung, A Sb~ctural Theoly of 
Imperialism, 13 Journal of Peace Research 81-94 (1971); I. Wallerstein, The Rise and 
Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Compamtive Analysis, 
16 Comparative Studies in Society and History 387-415 (1974). 
20 See generally some of the most influential representatives of realist theory: 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th 
ed., Kenneth W. Thompson ed. 1985); Kennan, Morality and Foreign Policy, 64 
Foreign Affairs 205-218 (198511986); HA. Kissqer, American Foreign Policy (1969); 
KN. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979); See also J.W. Nobel, De Utopie 
van het Realisme: De Machtstheorie van Hans J. Morgenthau en de Kritiek op het 
Amerikaanse Beleid in de Koude Oorlog (1985). 
in the international system. Other actors, like international governmental and non- 
governmental organizations, also function in the international system, but their role 
is without doubt subordinate to the role of states. 
The behaviour of states is dominated by an intense competition for scarce 
resources and a continuous threat of interstate conflict. "States are always seeking 
to assure their own security and prosperity within the limits of (...) scarce 
re~ources."~' No effective international machinery exists that can guarantee the 
security of the state. The international system is essentially an anarchical system in 
which states have to rely on self help for the protection of their national interests. 
Military power provides the best source for this. The use of military force is 
therefore seen as a usable and legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Keeping a 
'balance of power' between the main powers is seen as the best guarantee for 
stability in this anarchical society. 
Since military power and economic capabilities are dominant forces in 
international relations, other issues are necessarily lower in the hierarchy of 
national foreign policy goals. The promotion of international peace or welfare as a 
foreign policy god, is in the realist view subordinate to the protection of national 
interests. Foreign policy should be independent of ideology or abstract moral 
obligations, its only goal is the protection of national i n t e r e ~ t s . ~  "Its primary 
obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral 
impulses that the individual elements of that society may exper ien~e . "~~  
In the realist model international law does not play a very important role in 
explaining international state behaviour. It is not a necessary nor an essential 
condition of international order. "International law cannot fulfil any of the 
functions that have been ascribed to it unless other conditions, not guaranteed by 
international law itself, are present."24 The main function of international law is in 
the opinion of Hedley Bull, to identify, as the supreme normative principle of 
political organization of mankind, the idea of a society of sovereign states. 
21 M. Smith, R. Little, M. Shackleton (eds), Perspectives on World Politics 15 
(1981). 
22 Van Staden, De Heerschappij van Staten: Het Perspectief van het Realisme, 
in Internationale Betrekkingen in Perspectief 22-26 (R.B. Soetendorp & A. van 
Staden eds. 1987). 
23 Kennan, supra note 20, at 205-206. 
24 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society; A Study of World Order in World 
Politics 143 (1977). 
International law states the basic rules of coexistence among these states and other 
actors, and helps to mobilise compliance with the rules of international s o ~ i e t y . ~  
17te need to broaden the concept of ~J I  'international law of coaistence' 
The rules of coexistence or 'the international law of coexistence' (as opposed to the 
'international law of cooperation'26) are generally recognized as the classic form of 
international law. They represent the traditional sphere of diplomatic interstate 
relations which was characteristic for the international society between the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648) and the first half of this century. It was the society of 
sovereign states, governed by a 'law of liberty'? built upon the assumption of 
conflicts of national  interest^.^^ 
However, the changed circumstances in the second part of this century shows 
that national sovereignty is a relative value. "National sovereignty must give way to 
international co-operative action as soon as the nation-state proves powerless to 
solve certain problems of defense or economy."29 States were no longer able to 
guarantee the wellbeing and security of their population without a growing 
dependence on international cooperation. 
Therefore, an 'international law of cooperation' had to be developed, built upon 
a community of interest. This requires a fundamentally different perception of the 
role of international law and an adjustment of the traditional methods of 
international law making in a world of coexistence. Of course, the law of 
cooperation will never replace the law of coexistence is long as states are the main 
actors on the world stage. The increase in the number of international 
organizations, with the extended UN family as the most important example, and 
especially the increase in their importance, both with respect to law making and 
policy formulation, are clear exponents of the developing law of international 
cooperation. 
The emergence of an international law of cooperation is also easily perceptible in 
international economic law. A close link exists between national economies and the 
25 Id. 14-141. 
26 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964). 
27 B.V.A. Reling, International Law in an Expanded World 85 (1960). 
28 Friedmann, supra note 26, at 57. 
29 RGling, supra note 27, at 77. 
international economic order. States have become dependent on international 
economic exchange and international legal cooperation. International rules and 
regulations have become an absolute necessity. Nevertheless, although based on a 
common economic interest, basic objectives of international economic law do not 
need to be contrary to the above mentioned principles of the law of coexistence. 
According to Petersmann, three basic legal objectives (in which elements of a law 
of coexistence are clearly present) are pursued in this 'new' law of economic 
cooperation: 
- the protection and delimitation of the autonomy of independent actors; 
- the coordination of their autonomous activities; and 
- the enhancement of legal security and order; thereby making international 
economic transactions and government interventions predictable and 
reducing transaction costs. 30 
The example of the efforts to promote a community of interests based upon a 
(legal) principle of solidarity between developed and less developed countries, shows 
that the role of self interest of states cannot be wiped out. The efforts, especially 
in the seventies, to formulate new principles of international economic cooperation- 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) - have not been very successful and 
did not yet lead to structural changes. This demonstrates that in order to reach 
consensus on principles which should establish the basis of a real community of 
interests, the realities of state sovereignty have to be taken into account.31 
With respect to the preservation of the environment it is almost unthinkable that 
a community of interest will not arise. The serious threats to all mankind as a 
result of the constant assault on the natural environment, will have to bring the 
actors closer together, and lead to the development of a effective system for 
environmental management based on the self interest of states, if not on their 
survival. 
However, before discussing this question in greater detail, I will fist examine 
some recent trends in the field of international political science. New concepts, as a 
reaction to the no longer (completely) satisfactory realist paradigm, did not only 
emerge in legal science, but, of course, also in political science. 
30 E.U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions of Public International Economic 
Law, in Restructuring the International Economic Order: The Role of Law and 
Lawyers 51 (P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. Koers, K Mortelmans eds. 1987). 
31 Cj, e.g., Van Dijk & Rood, Function and Effectiveness of Supervision in an 
Economical& Interdependent World, Id. at 135-149. 
The theory of compla interdependence 
The realist model of international relations has been (and still is) subjected to much 
criticism. Among the most important shortcomings are (1) the absolute dominance of 
states as world actors and the fact that states are seen as rational and coherent 
units; (2) the (linear) relation between the role states play in international affairs 
and their place in the overall international hierarchy of (military) power; and (3) 
the assumption that in the absence of international authority a continuous threat of 
international conflict exists. These fundaments of realist theory are, according to its 
critics, no longer (completely) valid for the explanation of international state 
behaviour. The oil crisis in the seventies, for example, showed that military power 
is no longer the only or most important source of state power. Other elements have 
to be taken into account as well. Also, for instance, the politization of issues in 
international relations and the formation of alliances of states, or of non state 
actors like multinational enterprises (e.g. bank consortia), undermines predictions 
made on the basis of national military or economic power about the outcome of 
international negotiations. Examples of this are the law of the sea negotiations in 
the seventies and the ongoing attempts to solve the current debt crisis. 
Based on these criticisms new perceptions of the structure and process of 
international relations have been developed. One of the most important 
achievements, which have laid the foundation for a new school of thought, is the 
'complex interdependence' approach followed by Keohane and ~ ~ e . ~ ~  Their ideas 
about international cooperation are based upon three assumptions: 
1) Multiple channels connect societies. States do not monopolize these contacts. 
There are many formal and informal connections, not only between governmental 
representatives at various levels, but also between transnational non- 
governmental organizations (commercial enterprises, political pressure groups) and 
individuals. International coalitions are formed irrespective of international 
boundaries. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to identify one unified 
national interest. 
2) The realist assumption about the hierarchy of issues is not accepted. Security 
issues do not necessarily dominate the international agenda. Economic, social, 
cultural, humanitarian, or other issues are not of a lower ranking than security 
32 R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence; World Politics in 
Transition (1977) [hereinafter Power and Interdependence]; See ulso Keohane & Nye, 
Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 International Organization 725-753 (1987). 
issues. A different organization of the international agenda is assumed. Issues 
and issue-areas are the main elements in this organization, whereby the 
politization of issues and linkages between issue-areas can explain some of the 
dynamics in the international system. Within an issue-area, the distinction 
between domestic policy and foreign policy often becomes blurred, mainly because 
many international issues arise from, or are closely connected with domestic 
policy. 
3) The usability and efficiency of military force, especially in an era of a nuclear 
armament, is limited as an instrument of international policy. "Military force is 
not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the 
issues, when complex interdependence prevails.d3 The international distribution 
of power is not only related to the overall military power structure, but also to 
the relevant sources of power, the distribution of opportunities and 
vulnerabilities within an issue area.% 
Approached from a somewhat different angle, it can be said that, in comparison to 
the realist assumptions, in a situation of complex interdependence international 
cooperation does play a more important role in explaining state b e h a ~ i o u r . ~ ~  Also, 
and perhaps even more important for the purpose of this study, is the fact that 
processes of international cooperation form the basis for analysis, and not the 
individual actor. As far as the relations between actors in the international system 
33 Power and Interdependence, supra note 32, at 25. 
34 The limitation on the usability of military force as an instrument of 
national policy, of course raises the question of alternative instruments. Economic 
bargaining power is important in this respect, but economic sanctions, for example, 
as an alternative instrument of national policy are much more difficult to use, 
mainly because of the repercussions this might have for the economy of the country 
invoking such sanctions. The role of peaceful methods of regulating interstate 
conflict increases, and with this the need of international (legal) principles forming 
the basis of this. The assertion that the lack of effective instruments guaranteeing 
the fulfillment of national interests in case of international conflict, suggests that 
(legal) methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes will become more important. 
However, if one takes a look at the present state of world affairs, there appears 
not to be much support for this thesis in reality. But if one takes a closer look at 
issue areas (like the law of the sea, international trade or environmental control) 
then some justification for this reasoning can be found. This line of reasoning can 
unfortunately not be further explored in this study. 
35 However, Keohane takes a more conservative position in Aficr Hegemony. 
R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (1984). 
are concerned, the following figure summarizes the main difference between the 
realist and complex interdependence approaches. (Annex I) 
Although one can with respect to the theory of complex interdependence savely 
speak of a new school of thought, it remains important to realize that not all basic 
concepts of realism are rejected. Keohane and Nye state in Power and 
interdependence that it is not their task to argue either the modernist or 
traditional (realist) position36 and conclude "that the traditional tools need to be 
sharpened and supplemented with new tools, not discarded"37. Furthermore they 
stress the point that, like the realist model, complex interdependence is an ideal- 
type, a model, and not always a completely reliable reflection of the real world.38 
"'Complex interdependence,' by contrast, is an ideal type of international system, 
deliberately constructed to contrast with a 'realist' ideal type ..!t39 
23. International regimes 
The theory of complex interdependence is based, among others, on the assumption 
that current world politics cannot be explained by referring to the overall 
performance of states, but also, or in some instances better, by looking at state 
behaviour in the context of a speciiic issue or issue area. Within these areas so 
called 'international regimes' have developed. The concept of international regimes 
offers a basis for a better explanation, not so much of the actual behaviour of 
individual states, but especially of changes therein, than the balance of power 
concept in realist theory does. 
The international regimes were introduced in international political science in 
1975 by ~uggie* and shortly thereafter accepted in scholarly writing as a basis for 
new research. Since the beginning of the eighties, the definition suggested by 
Krasner is widely followed. He defines international regimes as 
36 Power and Interdependence, supra note 3 5  at 4. 
37 Id. at 162. 
Keohane & Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, supra note 32, at 
731. 
39 Id. 
Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trendr, 29 
International Organization 557-583 (1975). 
"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice."41 
To make a clear distinction between principles, norms and rules is not an easy 
task. Keohane in After Hegemony, for example, specifies that norms should not be 
perceived as morally regardless of considerations of narrowly defined self 
interest, but simply as standards of behaviour, whether adopted on grounds of self 
interest or otherwise.42 Ernst B. Haas, on the other hand, merges principles and 
norms in his definition, since it is very difficult to make a operational distinction 
between these two?3 He defines regimes as "norms, rules and procedures agreed to 
in order to regulate an issue-area".44 I do not want to enter at this place this 
highly theoretical discussion and therefore I will take this definition as a basis for 
the rest of this study. 
The distinction between international regimes as defined by political scientists 
and international law is not always clear. In international legal literature the word 
regime is since long used to described the rules and regulations in a certain area: a 
fishing regime, money regime, trade regime. Even in the research undertaken by 
political scientists most attention is given to the regulatory aspect of regimes, to 
the rules and procedures, thus to the aspects shared with the international legal 
definition of regimes. Why then, is it necessary to make this distinction? 
It could be said that the legal regime is more a formalized approach in which 
the subjective aspects plays a relatively minor role. It concentrates on rules and 
procedures, on rights and obligations. However, the subjective aspect which is part 
of the regime approach might be important in order to explain the underlying 
reasons for international cooperation, and in relation to this, to explain changes in 
regimes as a function of changes in the subjective values, or norms. The subjective, 
41 Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening ViMables, 36 International Organization 186 (1982). See d o  Rood, 
Intemafionale Regimes, in R.B. Soetendorp & A. van Staden eds., supra note 22, at 
214. 
42 R.O. Keohane, supra note 35, at 57. 
43 See also Haggard & Simmons, 77aeories of Intemational Regimes, 41 
International Organization 491-517 (1987). 
44 Haas, supra note 10, at 358. 
or perhaps it is better to call it the normative aspect, helps to explain why states 
wish to cooperate in a certain issue-area; it reflects a sense of common purpose, a 
basic value underlying the regulation in rules and procedures?5 
For example, in most theories - political as well as legal - state sovereignty is 
adopted as the fundamental value upon which a system of world order is built and 
hus to be built. Briefly, I admit, we have seen how .this has been worked out in 
realist theory. Also in the neorealist theory, sovereignty is maintained as the most 
important basis for analysis, although realist theory is amended by taking into 
account changes in the process of international cooperation. Self interest is the 
most important motivation for states to engage in international cooperation or to 
participate in an international regime. No high moral values play a role in this. A 
role for international law, the acceptance thereof also being motivated to a large 
extent by self interest, is however fiercely rejected by international political 
scientists. 
A case in point is the role attached to international law in neorealist theory. 
The acknowledgement of the existence of international regimes, which as we have 
seen resemble legal regimes, does not change this perspective. Keohane, for example 
is quite outspoken in this. With respect to the question whether regimes could make 
up a kind of international constitutional framework, he observes: "...world politics is 
decentralized rather than hierarchic: the prevailing principle of sovereignty means 
that states are subject to no superior government. The resulting system is 
sometimes referred to as self-help. Sovereignty and self-help mean that principles 
and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic 
society,"* and "[ilnternational regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a 
new international order 'beyond the nation-state'. They should be comprehended 
chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of a system in 
which sovereignty remains a constitutive principle."47 
However interesting this abstract discussion on the relation between international 
political regimes and international legal regimes may be, I will not proceed in this 
direction at this place. I have to conclude here that there seems to be a 
tremendous gap between political and legal reasoning with regard to the role of 
international regulatory mechanisms (regimes). International lawyers see these as 
45 Cf. Hart's 'internal aspect' of law, supm note 12. 
* Keohane, supm note 35, at 62. 
47 Id. at 63. 
examples of the existence of international law, whereas political scientist try to 
downplay the legal element in regime theory as much as possible. In my opinion, 
there is no reason for such a strict distinction. The only result of this is that two 
related fields of study develop in different directions, while leaving uncultivated the 
common ground in their theories. I hope that I will be able to come back to this in 
a later stage of my research. I will now return to the general discussion about 
regimes. 
First, what are possible functions of international regimes? Nye and Keohane 
regard international regimes essentially as a mechanism to link the basic structure 
of the international system to processes which take place within this system: 
"International regimes are intermediate factors between the power structure of 
an international system and the political and economic bargaining that takes 
place within it. The structure of the system (the distribution of power resources 
among states) profoundly affects the nature of the regime (the more or less 
loose sets of formal and informal norms, rules, and procedures relevant to the 
system). The regime, in turn, affects and to some extent governs the political 
bargaining and daily decision-making that occurs within the system.'& 
To be more concrete, at least four functions of a regime can be distinguished. First, 
regimes facilitate burden sharing. They help persuading governments to contribute to 
a collective objective, since standards are established that apply to all states. 
Second, regimes provide a body of shared information, which is essential for 
effective international action, but also for international stability. Government 
policies based on shared information might be more predictable, and less subject to 
unanticipated reactions to unexpected events. Third, regimes bring some kind of 
order in international relations by clustering issues. For great powers with multiple 
and varied interests, it especially is important to have frameworks (of rules) in 
which particular negotiations can take place. Fourth, international regimes reinforce 
continuity in foreign policy when national administrations change.49 
Often cited examples of international regimes are the trade regime (GAIT), the 
international money regime (IMF, World Bank), the regime of the oceans (UNCLOS 
III) and the oil regime. 
In most writings, regimes are especially conceived as mechanikms which can help 
to create a better understanding of the international system, and of changes that 
take place within it. However, at this point a basic question should be asked: is it 
sufficient to use regimes, or regime theory, to explain (changes in) international 
48 Power and Interdependence, supra note 32, at 21. 
49 Keohane & Nye, supm note 8, at 153-154. 
state behavior, or should regimes be explained themselves? Most regime theorists 
concentrate on the 6rst aspect. Critics of regime theory b i d  that regime theory 
itself does not explain international structures, but that they themselves have to be 
explained Probably both are right. A combination of both is necessary. In 
the next paragraph I will deal with some of the 'internal aspects' of regimes. 
24. Memat id  reghnes and inknational learning 
Haggard and Simmons mention four different approaches in regime theory: 
structural, game theoretic, functional, and cognitive.51 The &st three are quite 
different from the last one - the cognitive approach. Haggard and Simmons contend 
that these first three are more or less state-centered, presuming unified rational 
actors, thus downplaying the central assumption of complex interdependence that 
foreign policy is integrally related to domestic structures and processes. In these 
theories, regimes are used as a variable to explain the international system. I will 
limit myself here to some remarks with regard to the cognitive approach, which is 
directed at the structure and processes. Cognitivists try to understand why 
cooperation exists within an issue area; they try to explain the substantive content 
of regime rules and their creation. They recognize the importance of ideology, the 
values and beliefs of actors, and the knowledge available to them about how to 
realize goals. Actor learning plays a central role in this, since learning can alter 
actors' interests and values. 
The combination of knowledge and ideology, values and perceptions is important 
since in the cognitivist view, rational utility maximalization cannot in itself explain 
regimesS2 States or individuals do not respond similarly to the same constraints and 
opportunities; much is dependent on past history, knowledge and purposes3 
Especially in situations characterized by incomplete information, uncertainty, and 
complexity, decisions are not necessarily the outcome of rational decision-making: 
See, e.g., Rood, supra note 41, at 238. See also S. Strange's fundamental 
critique on the concept of regimes: Cave1 Hie Dragarrcs, 36 International 
Organization 479-496 (1982). 
51 Haggard & Simmons,  sup^ note 43, at 498. 
52 Compare Keohane's notion of 'bounded rationality'; Keohane, supra note 35, 
at 112. 
53 Haggard and Simmons,  sup^ note 43, at 511. 
"]he degree of ideological consensus and agreement over causal relationships ... is 
an important variable in international cooperation.d4 
Development of international consensus over a certain body of knowledge, 
therefore, involves bridging of ideological differencesS5 It is a form of 'cognitive 
convergence'. Successful negotiations, from this point of view, can be seen as a 
learning process, in which perspectives on national interests 'change. 
Teamhg takes place if and when the bargaining positions of the parties begin 
to converge on the basis of consensual knowledge tied to consensual goals (or 
interests), and when the concessions that are exch ed by the parties are 
-6 perceived as instrumental toward the realization of joint gains. 
~ n o w l e c l ~ e ~ ~  and goals become consensual when they succeed in dominating the 
policy-making process.58 This means that they have to be accepted by all major 
actors in the process. Yet, more is necessary for successful international 
collaboration. Joint gains have also to be identified, as is stressed in the last part 
of this quotation. It seems therefore important that the body of consensual 
knowledge provides information about these joint gains, or better, about the costs 
and benefits of the policy options. In a situation of complex interdependence, where 
a multitude of actors play a role in international regime-building, the task of 
providing this kind of information can easily be associated with international 
research institutes, think-tanks, and other forms of (non-governmental) international 
scientific collaborations9 
It is impossible to create regimes with only benefits and no costs. Joint costs, 
however, is a concept that is more di£ficult to understand than joint gains, but at 
the same time it is probably a more important concept. Problems in reaching 
agreement upon the distribution of costs are very likely to prevent efficient 
cooperation in many areas, since, of course, this touches directly upon the self- 
interest of states. What are equitable or equivalent contributions of states in a 
54 Id. 
55 Ideology might be perceived in this respect as a set of fundamental 
principles and values which form the basis for the behaviour of a state, or of its 
representing individuals and other actors active in international cooperation. 
56 Haas, supra note 10, at 393. 
57 "The sum of technical information and of theories about this information 
(...)", Haas, Id. at 368-369. 
58 Id. at 370. 
59 Id. at 389. 
situation in which it is often extremely difficult to determine these (long-term) 
costs? The difficulties, for example, in reaching agreements on the protection of the 
natural environment, which in many cases have to be based upon imperfect 
knowledge about causes and effects are probably a case in point. 
Not only material cost are perceptible. Also immaterial cost, like the loss of 
sovereignty, or for example the transfer to an international court of the power to 
settle disputes, might be regarded as joint costs connected with the establishment 
of, or accesion to, an international regime. 
25. Conclusion to chapter two 
What conclusion can one possible draw from a chapter in which so many theoretical 
concepts are mentioned and only dealt with very briefly? The only conclusion I can 
think of is the fact that although there are many difficulties in combining theories 
from two disciplines, it is worth the effort. Reading about these theories it was not 
difficult to shift elements from them that seem useful for further elaboration. The 
greatest dBiculty will be to find the right methodology for doing this. 
Systems analysis, as described in the introductory chapter, will provide the basic 
methodology of resarch in this study. As explained, it concentrates not on the 
individual actors and their individual motives, but on the dynamic interrelationships 
between the actors in the system, thereby concentrating on problems and challenges 
that these actors can only solve through a common effort. International 
environmental law, or to accomodate international political scientists, the 
development of an international environmental management regime, will serve as a 
test area. The European attempts to stop the acidification resulting from longe 
range transboundary air pollution will be treated as a case study. 
In the discussion of these European efforts, I will point at several elements that 
are important in a systems analysis approach. However, as already stated in the 
introduction, I will refrain from trying to present a comprehensive analysis of the 
(European) environmental management system. 
3. THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN REGIME FOR THE ABATEMENT OF ACID 
RAIN 
The theoretical concepts introduced in the preceding chapters will now be applied in 
a more practical context of acid rain abatement in Europe. Five considerations have 
led to the choice this subject. First, the subject matches clearly the basic features 
of 'complex interdependence' as described briefly in the second chapter. This does 
not need much illustration. (i) Acid rain can not be stopped by the use, or threat 
of military (or economic) power. (ii) it is a subject that is not subordinate to the 
so-called issues of 'high politics' (e.g. negotiations on arms reduction are taking 
place side by side with negotiations on environmental matters. This does however 
not exclude the linkage of these issues in international negotiations.60 (iii) 
environmental policy is apparently not (longer) belonging to the exclusive domain of 
foreign ministries, but is one of the most striking examples of the present 
democratization of international relations. 
The fact that the European discussion on acid rain abatement takes place in a 
east-west context make it even more suitable as a case study of interdependence. 
Second, environmental problems of this kind are also interdependent in the sense 
that they cross disciplinary boundaries. The interplay between science - or scientific 
progress in the understanding of the causes and effects of acidification - and 
policy-making is of profound importance. Every day new information is added to the 
knowledge about acid rain. This increasing amount of information makes it of course 
more di£Ficult for the decision-makers to keep track of all the new developments. 
An information gap between scientists and those responsible for taking action on 
the problem already exists61, and a widening of this gap should be avoided. 
Therefore, new, more sophisticated (international) organizational approaches have to 
be chosen. It is one of the characteristics of an emerging international regime that 
policy-making and policy-preparation have to take place in an increasingly 
interdisciplinary (or multidisciplinary) and therefore more complex environment. 
International negotiations have become an essential element for the management of 
complex of wbich a certain degree of decentralization in international 
See infra text accompanying note 74. 
61Alcamo, Am-, Hettelingh, Holmberg, Hordijk, K h i r i ,  L. Kauppi, P. 
Kauppi, Kornai, Miikelii, Acidification in Europe: A Simulation Model for Evaluating 
Control Strategies, 16 Ambio 232 (1987). 
62 Cf. Mautner-Markhof, International Negotiations: Mechanisms for the 
Management of Complex Systems, 23 Cooperation and Conflict; Nordic Journal of 
International Politics 95-106 (1988). 
decision making is also characteristic. With respect to legal decision making, 
Livingstone pointed at a situation that 
"In responding to the challenges of science and technology, international law 
is thus caught in the aradox of centralking its norms and organs, while 
decentralizing its process." %3 
Third, traditional conference diplomacy can no longer fulftl the requirements of 
decision making in highly complex regimes. Internationalization and the development 
of permanent channels of contact and continuous cooperation are inevitable.64 The 
structure of the international negotiations (or, better, international policy-making) 
on measures to abate acid rain seems to be developing into such a direction. It 
meets the requirements of modem conference diplomacy, as for example developed 
during the UNCLOS III negotiations, or more recently in the negotiations on the 
IAEA conventions on notification and assistance in the w e  of nuclear accidents.65 
But, at the same time, it moves beyond these new directions in international 
negotiation, since the negotiations are no longer held in the framework of a 
conference, subject to a time schedule, but are a continuous process. 
Fourth, an international regime is developing. It is obvious that international 
regulation in the form of (binding) rules and regulations is absolutely necessary for 
effective, long term strategies. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution and its Helsinki and Sofia protocols are first steps in this direction. The 
acceptation of rules and regulations - as we have seen in the second chapter - is 
one essential element of international regime building. 
Fifrh, the other important element of an international regime is the presence of 
shared norms and values. These provide a basis for international cooperation in the 
form of a regime. Acceptation of rules and regulations in itself is not enough. 
Without these shared norms, active cooperation would hardly be possible and would 
not lead to the creation of a regime. In the w e  of absence of shared norms it 
might be better to speak of 'coexistence', a form of minimal cooperation based upon 
the avoidance of (open) conflict. In the present case of environmental regime 
building this means that states have to move beyond the accepted norms of 'good 
63 D. Livingston, Science, Technology, and International LOW: Present Trends 
and Future Developments, in The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 
N, The Structure of the International Environment 119 (Black C.E. and Falk R.A. 
eds. 1972). 
64 Kiss & Shelton, supra note 2. 
65 See infra paragraph 4.2. on modern conference diplomacy. 
neighbourliness' and the duty of information and consultation, which are more or 
less of a 'coexistence type' of norms. Active cooperation, in which concern for the 
environment as a norm wiU have to be incorporated in national and international 
(economic) planning and in which ecological notions are not seen as impediments but 
as prerequisites for further development, is an absolute necessity.66 
This implies that states and international organisations (whether governmental or 
non-governmental) will have to go through a learning process in order to reconcile 
their current international value orientation which is in most cases still based on 
notions of coexistence. Again, the east-west context, until recently marked by a 
rigid 'peaceful coexistence' approach, is an appropriate test area. 
3 2  The Ccmwntim on --Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
With the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva, 1979) a 
first multilateral instrument in the field of air pollution was adopted.67 A period of 
about ten years had been necessary for governments to realize that acid deposition, 
or acid rain, posed a serious threat to large areas in Europe and that joint action 
was needed.68 Yet, even in 1979 many governments still saw the problem as a local, 
or regional one, mainly concerning Scandinavia and Canada. This accounts for the 
66 Cf. World Commission on Environment and Development ('Brundtland 
Commission'), Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (1987); Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, Environmental Protection and 
Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations (1986). 
67 Entered into force on 16 March 1983, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. (1979). For 
some background information regarding this convention and other international 
environmental legal instruments, see, e.g., A.L. Springer, The International Law of 
Pollution: Protecting the Global Environment in a World of Sovereign States (1983); 
Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 Hanard 
International Law Journal (1973); L.K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy; 
Emergence and Dimensions (1984). 
68 For more detailed information on the problem of acid rain, see genemlly, P. 
Mandelbaum (ed), Acid Rain: Economic Assesment (1985); D.D. Adams & W.P. Page 
(eds), Acid Deposition; Environmental, Economic, and Policy Issues (1985); C. 
Flinteman, B. Kwiatkowska, J.G. Lammers (eds), Transboundary Air Pollution: 
International Legal Aspects of the Co-operation of States (1986); IH. van Lier, Acid 
Rain and International Law (1980): Pallernaerts, The Politics of Acid Rain Conbwl in 
Europe, 30 Environment 42-44 (1988); Sand, Air Pollution in Europe; International 
Policy Responses, 29 Environment 16 (1987); T. Schneider (ed), Acidification and its 
Policy Implications, Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Amsterdam 
May 5-9,1986 (1986). 
fact that the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution does not 
contain many specific obligations for states. In fact, real pollution control measures 
were not accepted, but the obligation to develop policies and strategies against air 
pollution. Article 3, for example, states that 
"The Contracting Parties, within the framework of the present Convention, 
shall by means of exchanges of information, consultation, research and 
monitoring, develop without undue delay policies and strategies which shall 
serve as a means of combating the discharge of air pollutants, taking into 
account efforts already made at national and international levels." 
Nevertheless, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, as we 
can observe almost ten years later, set into motion an irreversible process in which 
slow but steady progress is made in the acceptation of stricter international 
emission standards for some of the most important air pollutants. At least it was 
recognized in 1979 that virtually all European countries are affected by the 
acidification problem. The forest dieback, damage to agriculture and building 
materials are examples of manifest and costly effects (both in terms of material and 
immaterial wellbeing). 
From 1983 onwards, the Convention entered into force on 16 March 1983, parties 
to the Convention have become more determined to adopt commitments for effective 
action. First, they decided to finance on a long-term basis the Cooperative 
Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of 
Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) .~~  Second, they adopted in Helsinki the Protocol 
on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 
Per Third, in November 1988 the Protocol on the Control of Emissions of 
Nitrogen Oxides was adopted in ~ o f i a ? ~  SO2 and NOx are among the most 
important sources of acid deposition. These recent developments show how the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution - in first instance seen as a 
declarative document without teeth - gradually evolves into a framework for further 
69 Protocol to the 1979 Concerning the Long-Term Financing of the Cooperative 
Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe (Geneva, 28 September 1984), reptinted in 27 I.L.M. 698 (1988). 
EMEP was established in l!V7 by the ECE, with support from UNEP and the WMO. 
70 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
on the Reduction of Sulpher Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 
30 per cent (Helsinki, 8 July 1985, entered into force 2 September 1987), reprinted 
in 27 I.L.M. 698 (1988). 
71 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary 
Fluxes, Sofia, 31 October 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989). 
action, although it has to be admitted that the action taken until now is 
insufficient. Individual states, and for example the European Communities are in a 
process of accepting much stricter standards than those laid down in the protocols. 
Nevertheless, the Convention is the best available basis for pan-european action. 
The Convention was prepared within the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (ECE). At least in the European context, the ECE seems to be a most 
suitable forum,72 since it is the only organization within Europe that meets the 
requirement of a membership of all European states. Furthermore, the ECE has a 
long standing experience in dealing with (environmental) matters on a European 
scale?3 An important impetus for the discussion of air pollution within this body 
came from the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). During that conference, the East European socialist countries wished to "set 
off Western pressure on basket-three issues (human rights, freedom of information, 
culture, etc.) inter alia by promoting basket-two issues (trade, scientific exchange, 
environment, etc.). This brought the ECE into the focus of negotiations"?4 It was 
recommended in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference as a specific measure that 
"within the framework of the United Nations Commission for Europe a study be 
carried out of procedures and relevant experience relating to the activities of 
Governments in developing capabilities of their countries to predict adequately 
environmental consequences of economic activities and technological 
development."75 
72 I will not deal with the North-American controversy concerning the 
abatement of acid rain. For this discussion see, e.g., G.S. Wetstone, & A. 
Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe and North America; National Responses to an 
International Problem (1983); Munton, Dependence and Interdependence in 
Transboundary Environmental Relations, 36 International Journal 139-184 (1986). 
Buttolph Johnson, The Dynamics of Acid Rain Policy in the United States, in Public 
Policy and the Natural Environment 261-283 (H.M. Ingram & R.K. Goldwin eds. 1985). 
73 The ECE was established in 1947 by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), in order to "initiate and participate in measures for facilitating 
concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Europe, for raising the level of 
European economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic 
relations of the European countries" (Terms of Reference, Art. l(a)) Since 1975 the 
UN ECE is composed of 34 member countries. For further information on the work 
of the UN ECE, see Economic Commission for Europe, ECE 1947 - 1987, (United 
Nations Publication, Sales No. E.87.II.E.17,1987). 
74 Bjdrkbom, Resolution of Environmental Problems: the Use of Diplomacy, in 
J.E. Carroll (ed), International Environmental Diplomacy, The Management and 
Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems 123-137 (1988). 
75 CSCE, Final Act, II5. 
Already before the end of the Helsinki Conference, the ECE had initiated at its 
thirtieth session in April 1975 a "broad-based programme of action on the 
implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Final ~ c t " ? ~  In 1976 the Senior 
Advisors to ECE Governments on Environmental Problems and its subsidiary body, 
the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems, started to prepare a draft agreement 
on long-range transboundary air pollution. With the assistance of groups of experts 
they succeeded within three years in drafting a text that was adopted in 1979 by 
acclamation at a High-Level Meeting within the Framework of the ECE on the 
Protection of the ~nvi ronment .~  The Convention entered into force in 1983 upon 
the twentyfourth ratification. 
33. The ECE as a Framework far European E n v i r d  
The ECE; activities and procedures79 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) deals with a wide range 
of subjects, including trade, industrial cooperation and standardization, science and 
technology, long-term economic planning and projection, environment protection, 
energy. The ECE carries out its work with a minimum of formality and by consen- 
sus. Basically, a two way system for programming of work is followed. The 
Commission provides overall guidance to its principal subsidiary bodies, while these 
bodies send recommendations for action to the Commission. The principal bodies are 
thus able to carry out their work semi-autonomously. 
The Commission meets once a year for about two weeks. Simple majority voting 
was the rule when the ECE was set up in 1947, but in that same year it adopted a 
resolution stressing the benefits of unanimous decisions. Since then, the Commission 
has adopted draft resolutions by consensus without a vote. In order to facilitate 
consensus, negotiations on draft resolutions take place outside the formal framework 
of the session, in an open-ended 'contact-group'. When agreement has been reached, 
76 ECE, 1987, pp.8-9. 
Together with the Convention two resolutions were adopted; a Resolution on 
Long-Range Air Pollution, and a Declaration on Low- and Non-waste Technology and 
Re-utilization and Recycling of Wastes. ECE Report E C E m  1/2, Annex II & 
Annex III. 
78 Reference to the Convention automatically includes the protocols unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. 
79 Based upon Economic Commission for Europe, supra note 73. 
decisions are taken by acclamation. Majority voting has become rare, the last 
majority decision was adopted in 1957. 
The overall plans and policies of the Commission are carried out by a network of 
specialized subsidiary bodies. (See Annex JI.) Currently there are 16 principal 
subsidiary bodies, amongst which the Senior Advisors to ECE Governments on 
Environmental Problems. With the help of their own specialized subsidiary bodies 
they carry out the tasks assigned to them by the Commission. The principal 
subsidky bodies enjoy a high degree of autonomy. They can agree on all matters 
within their competence and make recommendations directly to participating 
governments. Representatives of ECE governments participating in these bodies are 
authorized to enter into agreements on behalf of their governments. 
Meetings of the Commission are held in public, those of all its subsidiary bodies 
are held in private. This enables participants to speak openly and tends to foster 
constructive and businesslike exchanges. A relater characteristic of the ECE's 
subsidiary bodies is its procedural informality. These bodies operate under the 
procedural rules of the Commission, however, in practice these rules are only 
applied with respect to the election of officers. All decisions are taken by 
consensus. 
Formal resolutions are rarely adopted. The substance of agreement is usually 
recorded in reports, which constitute a recommendation for governmental action, 
although the adoption of formal agreements is nor precluded. Examples of formal 
agreements can be found in the field of norms and standards for foodstuffs or the 
construction of motor vehicles. These are of special importance for the 
harmonization of policies and legislation in the ECE region. Another example is, as 
we have seen, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
The Secretariat (an integral part of the UN Secretariat) plays an important role 
in the preparation of meetings. (See Annex 111) Since its financial resources are 
insufficient, those governments interested in a particular project offer the services 
of specialists - called rapporteur - to carry out (free of charge) substantive work 
which otherwise would have to be undertaken by the Secretariat. Especially if 
several rapporteurs are assigned to a task, subsidiary bodies are provided with 
substantive reports covering a wide range of expertise. 
The Senior Advisors to ECE Governments on Envimnmental Ptoblems and the 
Executive Body 
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution has been established 
within the context of the air pollution unit of the ECE Senior Advisors on 
Environmental Problems. Beside air pollution, the Senior Advisors deal with subjects 
like environmental impact assessment, treatment of waste, resources etcetera. The 
Senior Advisors have established the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems, 
which together with subsidiary bodies established by the Executive Body, work on 
the evaluation and implementation of the Convention. 
The Executive Body is one of the two permanent organs established under the 
Convention (the other is the Secretariat). It is constituted in the framework of the 
Senior Advisors and functions as the assembly of representatives of the contracting 
parties. It meets at least annually and has the duty to: 
(a) review the implementation of the present Convention; 
(b) establish, as appropriate, working groups to consider matters related to the 
implementation and development of the present Convention and to this end 
prepare appropriate studies and other documentation and to submit 
recommendations to be considered by the Executive Body; 
(c) fulfil such other functions as may be appropriate under the provisions of 
the present   on vent ion.^^ 
In accordance with paragraph 2.b of Article 10, the Executive Body has established 
a large number of working groups, groups of experts, and task forces, all dealing 
with technical, economic and scientific aspects of the air pollution problem. A 
schematic overview of the organizational structure is provided in Annex IV. 
Political aspects are not dealt with by these subsidiary groups. However, as we 
already have seen in the second chapter, it is impossible in the process of learning 
to make a strict distinction between the political aspects and the scientific aspects 
of a problem. A compromise in the 'scientific phase' of negotiations, involves what 
we have called ideological choices. If parties can agree on the causes and effects 
of, for example, acid rain, this will have an enormous impact for the wider 
negotiations on a abatement strategy. This was acknowledged in a report by the 
Norwegian Government, in which it was stated that 
"The assistance of the designated experts has proved to be an efficient way 
of providing state-of-the-art reviews. Although experts participate in their 
personal capacity during informal meetings of 2-3 days, there is little doubt 
80 Art. lO(2). 
that many confrontations are sorted out, and many compromises take shape 
already at this preparatory level.tt81 
Especially the fact that these 'working groups' and 'task forces' are rather informal 
and that discussions are not intended to be made public, but that they nevertheless 
operate within a clear structure, makes this form of cooperatiodconsultation a 
useful basis for an informal dialogue. An institutional framework for the 
implementation of the results of such a dialogue is of course necessary for an 
optimal result. As was set out in a Swedish study, it is not enough to indicate 
potential gains of international cooperation with the help of sophisticated scientific 
or technical models. Without a proper institutional framework much of it will be 
never be effected.82 
It would, in my opinion, be a positive development when information on political 
positions would be exchanged in small, informal groups, in the same way as is done 
with respect to scientific or technical aspects of the problem. Identifying and 
cl+g international and especially national political constraints might facilitate 
the creation of the right atmosphere for political decision making. Such an exchange 
of views could be of importance for the discussion on common aims and, thus, for a 
coordinated value orientation. 
3.4. Conclusion to chapter three 
The case of acid rain abatement has showed that at present most European states 
have accepted the need for an environmental policy, domestically as well as 
internationally, and take part in an international policy making structure. Within 
this system, consultation and exchange of information are the most important 
instruments for cooperation. Scientists, policy advisors and policy makers work 
together in a rather open and informal manner on a variety of issues connected 
with the problem of long range air pollution. 
The outcome of this process in terms of legal, enforceable Ilghts and obhgations 
remains modest. Two, by far not adequate protocols have been accepted. This, 
however, is not the point I want to stress in this chapter. The question is, and I 
admit that I will not be able to answer it on the basis of my research thus far: 
Does this institutional structure provide a promising basis for further environmental 
81 The special appointed 'rapporteurs' are called in the context of the Conven- 
tion on Long-Range Air Pollution 'governmentally designated experts'. 
82 GE CostlBenefit Analyses, EBAIR/GE.2/R.15,24 Sept. 1986. 
cooperation in Europe? Or phrased in another way: Does this structure contribute to 
the formulation of shared (environmental) values in Europe, upon which a regime for 
environmental control can be build? 
This is in my view a fundamental question. Just as free international trade 
provides the basis for GAlT, and the freedom of the high seas is one of the 
general accepted values in the 'ocean regime', a common value orientation is needed 
for environmental management. It is evident that at this moment such a common 
value orientation is still absent, although, for example within the European 
Communities (EC) some positive developments are visible. At present however, the 
differences between EC-cooperation and ECE-cooperation are much larger than the 
similarities. Perhaps it is possible to say that 'learning' - redefining national 
interest on the basis of new information and knowledge - within the EC (with 1992 
in sight) is taking place with increasing speed, while in the ECE context such a 
process did not yet start. 
What the exact content of this common value orientation will be is hard to 
predict. One of the elements, however, will be the fact that states realize that 
internationalization of environmental management is required and that they have to 
give up part of their sovereignty as far as environmental decision making is 
concerned. 
How can the development of such a common value orientation take place? 
Basically two mechanisms for change can be distinguished: pressure of external 
events and a rational learning process based on rational utility maximalization (or at 
least sat i~faction)~~. I will deal with some aspects of this in the next chapter, 
where I will turn to some more theoretical aspects of the - what 1 have called in 
the Introduction - secondary level of analysis. I hope that these considerations will 
be helpful for the further development of a systems analysis approach to 
environmental law malung, c.q. regime building. 
4. THE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION C O ~ O N  IN A WIDER 
PERSPECTIVE OF POLICY CHANGE 
What is required in order to remove obstacles for a closer cooperation between 
ideologically opposing groups of states? How can the reluctant behavior of most 
European states be turned into active cooperation, into an environmental 
83 Cf. Keohane's 'bounded rationality', supm note 35. 
management regime? We have seen in the preceding chapters that the adoption of 
certain rules and regulations providing the basis for active cooperation, or in other 
words, that going beyond the 'law of coexistence' is difficult without the existence 
of shared norms and principles. A common value-orientation is necessary. 
To what extent are such norms evolving in the process of ECE environmental 
cooperation? Are exchanges in the ECE context taking place on the basis of an 
emerging common value orientation and is it possible to see the Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution as a fist result? 
Phrased in this way, it would seem hardly measurable. One reason for this being 
the fact that such norm creation either takes place gradually, or through sudden 
change, by way of a shock. Frequently, crises will provide the most easily 
identifiable, explanation for change. An example of this is the changed attitude of 
states after the Chernobyl accident. This led to the speedy adoption of two 
conventions dealing with notification and assistance in case of nuclear accidents. 
Also, changes in value orientation will not seldom strongly depend upon, for 
example, the personality of the persons involved and a right timing. 
In this study, I am not concerned with change as a result of shocks, but more 
with gradual change, although the difference is not always very clear. The 
awareness of, for example, the massive forest dieback - which is in itself a gradual 
process - may come as a shock to many people (decision makers included) after 
having seen a television documentary. 
In order to assess whether gradual norm development, or change in value 
orientation, is likely in the context of European action against air pollution I will 
take a closer look at the process of international cooperation. This means, looking 
at the actors in the process, the interplay between science and policy/politics, and 
at (stimulating) changes of norms. 
I will look at the process from two, not completely unrelated perspectives, 
namely a, what I call, 'policy analysis approach' and a 'diplomacy approach'. The 
'policy analysis approach' is concerned more with actors, interests, believe systems, 
value orientation etc. and is to an important extent based on policy science 
literature, which is mostly related to observations in domestic situations. The 
'diplomacy approach' is internationally oriented and deals mainly with the the law 
making process. 
4.1. The p r o a s  of cooperalian; a policy a d y s k  approach 
A public policy analysis framework is not very frequently used for the assessment 
of international processes of cooperation. A reason for this is the fact that in the 
international sphere no real public policy makmg is assumed to exist. One of the 
features of 'complex interdependence' is however that we are moving away from the 
traditional, rather limited interaction between sovereign governments through 
diplomatic channels. Instead, international policy subsystems are developing in a 
variety of areas, amongst others in the area of environmental protection. 
The use of techniques developed in policy science may contribute to a better 
understanding of these developments at the international level and, on a longer 
term, may strengthen the efficacy of international policy making. Policy science is 
mostly concerned with domestic policy making, but this does not necessarily 
preclude its usefulness it in an international setting, although one has to be 
constantly aware of differences such as the decentralised character of international 
policy makmg and the important role of self help as the result of the lack of 
adequate legal enforcement mechanisms. 
In this section I will try to give an example of a possible approach of the 
incorporation of policy science into international political and legal theory. At this 
place it cannot be more than a preliminary attempt of such an approach. More 
research needs to be under taken in this respect. Here, I will follow the conceptual 
framework developed by ~ a b a t i e r . ~  It is impossible to discuss this framework in all 
its aspects, therefore, I will have to confine myself to some of the basic elements 
and try to relate these to international policy making. For a more extensive 
treatment, and full references to the abundance of research and literature forming 
the basis for Sabatier's framework, I have to refer to the his article in Policy 
Sciences. 85 
Policy subsystems and advocacy coalitions 
The core of Sabatier's approach is the concept of policy subsystems. A policy 
subsystem should be understood as the interaction of actors from a variety of public 
and private institutions, actively concerned with a policy problem or issue. Among 
the actors are administrative agencies, legislative committees and interest groups 
Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role 
of Policy-Oriented Leming merein, 21 Policy Sciences 129-168 (1988). 
85 Id. 
active in policy formulation and implementation at various levels of government, as 
well as journalists, researchers and policy analysts. 
Subsystems tend to become relatively autonomous as the actors become more 
specialized. Policy areas are so complex that specialization becomes unavoidable. It 
is hardly possible to be knowledgeable about more than one or two policy sectors. 
Within subsystems actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions 
composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and 
causal beliefs and who often act in concert. In most subsystems, the number of 
significant coalitions will be small. 
In this context it should be stressed that a basic premise of Sabatier's 
conceptual framework is the fact that "public policies (or programs) can be 
conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities 
and causal assumptions about how to realize them".% Public policies incorporate 
implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives, involving, for example, value 
priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships and perceptions of the 
efficacy of policy instruments. 
Policy change proposed by advocacy coalitions is therefore closely related to the 
integration of knowledge of the state of problem parameters and factors affecting 
them, with the basic values and causal assumptions comprising the core belief of the 
advocacy coalition. This integration can be labelled as 'policy oriented learning'. 
Advocacy coalitions may change their beliefs or strategies on the basis of the 
adequacy of governmental decisions, or new information that becomes available. 
Policy oriented learning however, does not explain changes in the core aspects of a 
policy, but alters secondary aspects of a belief system. Changes in the core are 
often the result of external non-cognitive factors. 
Examples of advocacy coalitions in the field of air pollution are for example a 
'clean air coalition' and a 'economic feasibility coalition', both sharing a particular 
belief system. Elements of the belief system of the 'clean air coalition' are, among 
others, the primacy of human health, the perceived inability of 'the market' to deal 
with problems such as air pollution and a preference for legal control. Basic 
attributes of the belief system of the 'economic feasibility coalition' are the balance 
between optimal conditions for human health and economic development, a greater 
trust in market arrangements and the preference for economic incentives in stead of 
legal command. 
86 Id. at 131. 
Between advocacy coalitions, a category of so called 'policy brokers' can be 
expected to exist, whose "dominant concern is with keeping the level of political 
conflict within acceptable limits and with reaching some 'reasonable' solution". 87 
Often elected officials, or high level civil servants play such a role in a national 
setting. 
In the international sphere a permanent secretariat of an international 
organization, or authoritative persons within them, could perform the function of 
broker. The Secretary General of the United Nations is of course an obvious 
example. The involvement of the IAEA and especially its Legal Division which was 
crucial for the outcome of the negotiations on the post-Chernobyl conventions forms 
another example.88 However, the distinction between brokers and advocates can in 
this respect be seen as a continuum, sometimes 'brokers' also act as advocates. The 
UNCTAD Secretariat, especially during the seventies, was clearly an advocate of the 
Third World coalition, while UNEP has an explicit assignment to perform as a 
broker. 
Structure of belief systems 
Sabatier distinguishes between a Deep (Normative) Core "of fundamental normative 
and ontological axioms which define a person's underlying personal philosophy", a 
Near (Policy) Core of basic strategies and policies for achieving Deep Core beliefs 
in the policy arealsubsystem in question, and a set of Secondary Aspects comprising 
a multitude of instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to 
implement the Policy Core in the specific policy area."89 These categories are 
arranged in order of decreasing resistance to change. The table in Annex V may 
illustrate the distinction. 
Members a coalition are assumed to substantially share beliefs on the level of 
Policy Core issues. Less consensus is expected on the Secondary (implementing) 
Aspects of the belief system. However, Secondary Aspects will be given up easier 
than acknowledging weaknesses of the Policy Core. 
87 Id. at 141. 
88 Mautner-Markhof, International Negotiations: Mechanisms for the 
Management of Complex Systems, 23 Cooperation and Conflict; Nordic Journal of 
International Politics 98-99 (1988). 
89 Sabatier, supra note 84, at 144. 
Policy change within subsystems; policy oriented learning 
Policy change can be the result of changes in the Policy Core and Secondary 
Aspects of the belief system, or be the result of external perturbation, such as 
changes in socio-economic conditions provoking changes in resources and constraints 
of subsystem actors. It is assumed that the Policy Core of a coalition is quite 
resistant against change over time. Secondary Aspects may be altered or abandoned 
in the search for realization of the core beliefs, but the core beliefs themselves are 
relatively stable and subject mainly to change through external pressure. 
This has important consequences for the potential role of policy oriented 
learning. In this perspective policy oriented learning is important in understanding 
changes in the Secondary Aspects of governmental action, but plays a less important 
role for change in the Core Aspects. 
Policy oriented learning can occur in different patterns: (1) Improving one's 
understanding of variables defined as important for one's belief system, e.g. by 
monitoring air quality by clean air coalitions; (2) refining one's understanding of 
logical and causal relationships internal to a belief system, thereby focussing on the 
search for improved mechanisms to attain core values, e.g. trying to reduce 'vehicle 
miles traveled' in order to reduce automotive emissions in stead of changing the 
cars; (3) identifying and responding to challenges to one's belief system, e.g. 
criticizing the (inefficient) legal command and control approach in the struggle 
against air pollution and in stead advocating an economic incentive approach. 90 
Thus far, policy oriented learning referred mainly to learning within a belief 
system. More important however, especially in the context of this study, is learning 
across belief systems. Learning across believe systems implies that one or all of the 
coalitions engaged in a analytical debate alter Policy Core aspects of their belief 
system, or at least important Secondary Aspects, as a result of this debate rather 
than of changes in external conditions. 
Several conditions for learning across belief systems can be mentionedg1 (1) All 
sides must have sufficient technical resources to be able to discuss the other's data 
and causal models, and the conflict must be of an intermediate character. If two 
sides launch a frontal attack on each other's core, it is not realistic to expect 
much changes in one of these. However, if the conflict is between Secondary 
90 Id. at 149-150. 
Id. at 155-156. 
Aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other, it is assumed that a 
positive condition for learning exists. 92 
(2) Probably more important however, is the forum in which the discussion 
between coalitions is taking place: 
Policy-oriented learning is most likely when there exists a forum which is: a) 
prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to 
participate; and b) dominated by professional n0rms.~3 
Professionality is stressed because under such conditions a more serious analysis of 
the methodical assumptions, and the elimination of more improbable causal relations 
and data is expected. The forum can take a variety of forms, ranging from 
professional journals, to conferences and (permanent) commissions. 
(3) Problems which can be expressed quantitatively are more conductive for 
policy oriented learning than problems of a more qualitative nature. Controlled 
examination of quantitative variables is better feasible than of qualitative variables 
which are subject to more subjective interpretations. Transboundary air pollution 
would in this perspective be a proper example for further examination. An important 
part of the debate focusses on quantitative variables &d the most far reaching form 
of transeuropean cooperation in this respect is the establishment of an 
environmental monitoring programme (EMEP). 
A better understanding, with the help of, for example, this policy oriented 
framework for analysis, of the factors affecting a policy area like transboundary air 
pollution, does not necessarily lead to ready made suggestions for resolving current 
policy conflicts. It will nevertheless be valuable for the assessment of ongoing 
processes on various levels of international cooperation. Especially with the 
development of an international (legal) environmental regime in mind, this policy 
92 Two examples from the international scene can be given. First, during the 
law of the sea negotiations in the seventies, the discussion on the system for deep 
seabed mining were extremely difficult, but ultimately led to a satisfactory outcome 
for most participants. The discussion focussed on shared exploitation of the 
'manganese nodules'. The industrialized states accepted the principle of a partly 
international exploitation for the benefit of the developing countries (the so called 
'parallel system'), which implied a change in their Core values. After this 
acceptation the discussion on the exact formula can be said to have been of a 
Secondary nature. After Reagan came to power in the US, he made clear that in his 
perception the sharing of exploitation benefits, and especially of the technologies 
used, was in conflict with one of his Core values. He therefore decided to neglect 
the agreement already reached and not to sign the Law of the Sea Convention. 
93 Sabatier, s u p  note 84, at 156. 
analysis approach clarifies some of the opportunities and constraints involved. In 
particular, it shows the importance of the differentiation between Core Aspects and 
Secondary Aspects, or - referring to the regime approach - between norms and 
rules. This offers a framework for the interpretation of current developments in 
international cooperation and for (national) policy recommendations. Nevertheless, 
however accurate this framework might be, it should not be forgotten that a 
critical, but unpredictable role is played by the already mentioned external events. 
A useful conclusion from the discussion of Sabatier's framework is the fact that 
computer simulation models can play a role in policy oriented learnin& but also that 
this role is probably limited to reaching agreement on Secondary Aspects. It is, on 
the basis of this framework, unlikely that this kind of tools for modem decision 
m a k q  will change basic perspectives of the actors involved. We will discuss this 
further in Chapter V. 
42. The international process of cooperation; a diplomacy approach 
The diplomacy approach focusses, in contrast to the policy analysis approach, more 
on the formaVinstitutional aspects of international cooperation. The !%st approach 
deals with elements that are important to understand (motivations for) the behaviour 
of actors, whereas the latter deals more or less with the circumstances that 
facilitate constructive international cooperation. 
It is in my view important to be aware of changes in the methods for reaching 
international agreement, since these changes might be seen as an attempt to deal 
with the increasing complexity of multilateral (inter state) relations. We have seen 
that their importance is also recognized in the theory on international regimes. 
Decision making procedures are one of the basic elements of an international 
regime. 
During the last decades several important law making conferences have taken 
place. The United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is 
by far the most important and to a certain extent the most successful example. 
Other recent examples are the conferences on the law of state succession, the law 
of treaties between states and international organizations, and the already 
mentioned IAEA conference on nuclear accidents. These conferences are 
characterised by the use of all kind of - old and new - negotiating techniques to 
enable decision making in fora consisting of more than 160 states, divided into 
several opposing ideological groups. Much has been learned from these experiences. 
I will give a short account of some of the developments and try to compare these 
with the negotiation model used in the ECE which was described in Chapter III. 
One common characteristic of the modem negotiation models I will discuss, is 
the fact that they are applied in multilateral negotiations aiming at the 
establishment of new regimes. Translated into legal terminology this means that they 
concern 'the of codification or progressive development of international law', which 
implies in the first place the need for the adoption of new (legal) norms rather 
than rules and procedures?4 Since with these agreements the basis of the 
international (legal) order is involved, it is necessary that most, if not all, states 
(within a certain issue area)95 agree with them. A majority decision cannot 
constitute a viable basis for conventions constituting the fundament of the "United 
Nations treaty network [which] has become the prime source of international laus'.% 
This network presently consists of some 300 multilateral agreements. 
Another characteristic of the models is that they concern global negotiations on 
issues in "need of action because, for example, large areas and not merely aspects 
of existing law are perceived to be in disarray, incomplete or unfair"97. Almost all 
states, and often many international (non) governmental organizations are taking 
part in the exchange. Prospects of substantial individual economic or political gains 
(utility maximalization) are essential to surmount the widely divergent political, 
economic, and cultural traditions. 
In a recent contribution, Roy S. Lee gave an elucidating account of the recent 
trends in negotiation techniques:98 informal meetings and negotiations in smaller 
groups (which are not subject to strict rules of procedure and in which a large 
degree of confidentiality exists), the package deal approach and the 'promotion of 
general agreement'. 
94 See the discussion on international regimes, supm paragraph 2.3. 
95 Not all regimes do not have to be world wid; or universally accepted to 
become of fundamental importance for international cooperation. A clear example is 
the international trade regime under GATT. Also the ECE can serve as an example. 
% Lee, Multilaterd Trealyrnaking and Negotiating Techniques: An Appraisal, 
in Contemporary Problems of International Law Essays in Honour of Georg 
Schwarzenberger 158 (B. Cheng & E.D. Brown eds. 1988). 
97 Plant, The Third United Nations Confernce on the LCTW of the Sea and the 
Preparatory Commission: Models for United Nations Law-Making, 36 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 557 (1987). 
98 Lee, supra note %. 
Informal meetings, often called colloquia, consultations, working groups or 
otherwise, do have certain common features such as "a smaller number of 
participants, no official records, closed meetings, no press releases, no observers 
and usually, no formal rules of procedure".w Direct dialogue is stimulated since only 
100 those states who are really interested participate in open-ended meetings . 
Decisions in these groups are usually taken by consensus or in the form of 'general 
agreements' rather than by majority decision or unanimity. 
The role of consensus 
Unanimity was the rule in the League of Nations, while after the Second World War 
democratic majority decision became the (formal) ground rule in the United Nations 
(and many other international organizations). Both, however, proved to be 
unrealistic methods for finding solutions for the immense problems of an ideological 
and economical divided world. Unanimity provides all participants with the power of 
veto, making decision making extremely difficult, whereas the principle of majority 
voting does not reflect a realistic picture of the present day world in which 
military or economic powerful states are not prepared to give up their dominant 
positions. 
Alternatives have been developed. One can think of weighted voting, as applied 
today in economic institutions like the IMF, or a refining of the majority rule by 
requiring 'special' majorities for certain decisions. The basic objective of all 
mechanisms, however, is the same: 
"to make sure that the decisions of the international community, taken within 
multilateral institutions, reflect a sufficiently wide consensus to be effective 
in practice as well as acceptable in theory."lol 
In practice, states have begun to develop and apply the concept of consensus itself 
as a method for decision-making in the UN context. Consensus is to be assumed 
99 Id. at 159. 
In open-ended meetings are all participants have a right to participate. In 
practice many members stay away and only a small number actually participate. The 
often troublesome discussion on the allocation of seats is avoided in this way. Id. 
lol Henrikson, The Global Foundations for n Diplomacy of Consensus, in 
Negotiating World Order, The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy 241 
(Alan K. Henrikson ed. 1986). 
when no formal objections exist against a proposal.102 Unanimity requires the 
express consent of the participants in the decision-making procedure. 
One of the earliest organizations, besides the EcElo3, to adopt consensus as the 
decision making rule (contrary to its formal procedures) was the UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN C O P U O S ) . ~ ~  This was a compromise between 
the Soviet Union who demanded unanimity and the United States opting for the 
majority vote. On the one hand the consensus rule delayed decision making, but on 
the other it became a guarantee for the world wide acceptance of the space treaties 
since "all shades of views and interests were taken into account".lo5 
A conference of major importance which adopted the consensus rule was 
UNCLOS III.lM Here, on the basis of a 'gentlemen's agreement', it was laid down 
in the rules of procedure that voting on substantive matters might take place only 
after it had been determined that all efforts at reaching general agreement had 
been exhausted. This in fact meant that consensus was the rule.lo7 It was applied 
during the conference and led to a comprehensive draft convention, accepted- 
sometimes grudgingly - without a single vote taken on any of the substantive issues. 
However, ultimately the United States, after the Reagan administration came to 
power, decided to ask for a vote on the Convention as a whole.lo8 
lo2 In practice this means that "(i) a decision hai been reached; (ii) no one 
officially or formally objects to it being declared adopted in that manner; and (iii) 
those who are not in complete agreement with the decision are prepared simply to 
make their views known and have them placed on record." Lee, supra note %, at 
165. See also A.Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (1986). 
lo3 See chapter 3 supra. 
UN Doc. NAC.105lOR.2 and UN Doc. N5181, Annex 11; See, e.g., E.R.C. 
van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986); N.M. Matte (ed), Space Activities and 
Emerging International Law (1984). 
lo5 Lee, supra note 96, at 167. 
lM See, e.g., Buzan, Negotiafing by Consensus: Developments in Technique at 
the United Nafions Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 American Journal of 
International Law (1981); Koh & Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third 
United Nalions Conference on the LOW of the Sea, in 1 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 29-134 (M.H. Nordquist ed. 1985); Plant, 
supra note 97. 
lo7 See also the difference between active and passive consensus, in .a  text 
accompanying notes 116-117. 
log Van Dyke, supra note !Q. 
Other examples can be given, but at this place it is sufficient to conclude that 
the consensus rule has become a vital element in the adoption of basic treaties. 
Perhaps a negative example clarifies the issue further. In the late seventies and the 
beginning of the eighties negotiations on conventions dealing with state succession 
took place. These negotiations were successful in so far that they led to the 
adoption of two conventions.lW However, the fact that an ideological gap existed 
between the Third World and the industrialized countries with regard to several 
subjects - and no persistent attempt was made to reach consensus on these issues- 
these conventions remain a death letter. Industrialized countries did not sign or 
ratify these conventions and the power of the (Third World) majority is not 
suflicient for the creation of new international law.ll0 
nte element of informality 
In order to reach consensus, creative procedures for discussion are needed. The 
informal, small group approach is one of the models developing at present. Of 
course, this has to be seen as a development complementing the existing models and 
not as providing a complete alternative.] 
Small groups have become absolutely necessary for efficient negotiations.''' The 
number of the participants require breaking up large, unwieldy conferences into 
small and representative groups.1* These groups can consist of interested individual 
states, or can be the reflection of the phenomenon of 'group diplomacy', with which 
is meant the participation in the negotiation of entities such as the Group of 77, 
the Non Aligned Movement, the OECD, regional groupings as the EC, NATO or 
ASEAN, or interest groups as landlocked countries', archipelagic states, or the 
industrial state group during UNCLOS III. 
Small groups can help to create an informal atmosphere which enables more 
direct and confidential contact between participants - the basis for a more 
lW Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Vienna 
22 August 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978). Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (Vienna 7 
April 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983). 
'lo Seidl-Hohenveldern, Dm Wiener Bereinkommen iiber Stautennachfolge in 
Verm&gen, Amhive und Schulden von Stauten, 34 ~stereichisches Zeitschrift fiir 
bffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 173-199 (1983). 
Henrikson, supra note 101, at 236-237. 
112 Koh in Henrikson, supra note 101. 
cooperative behaviour. Koh even holds that "[a]s a general rule, the more informal 
the nature of the group, the easier it is to resolve a problem"1*. Confidentiality of 
the discussions is of major importance in this respect. Therefore, in informal 
meetings no official records are made, nor are the press or a large audience 
admitted to the deliberations. Only the results are presented in public. This is of 
course disadvantageous for researchers and others who have to interpret texts 
afterwards, since conference proceedings are a valuable source for their 
interpretation. 
But things look different if one realises that one page of a type written 
verbatim record costs about $500 per language114 and that these proceedings are 
not always very useful, since the real reasons behind positions taken during the 
negotiations are seldom publicly stated. Another cost related element is the 
convenient circumstance that it is not necessary to conduct informal negotiations in 
all official UN languages. Often one or two working .languages are chosen. This is 
not only attractive from a financial point of view, but also avoids the inevitable 
loss of nuance during translation and interpretation into six languages. 115 
Of essential importance in informal procedures is creativity and influence of the 
presiding officer. He has to pave the way to consensus by identifying areas for 
agreement and submitting proposals to overcome disagreement; in short, he is the 
guide in a often rough and unexplored terrain. This importance is exemplified by the 
distinction made in recent literature between 'passive' and 'active' consensus, 
whereby the latter is 
"designed to provide impetus towards achieving consensus by according the 
president (...) the initiative in producing informal negotiating texts, which 
effectively obliged States to take Positions to encourage or discourage the 
formation of consensus around themn1 
Active consensus was the technique used in the UNCLOS III negotiations.'l7 
That not just one single road leads to consensus is made clear by Adede when 
he describes the methods of work of three chairmen of subgroups during the 
l* Id. 
Lee, supra note %, at 160. 
115 Id. 
116 Plant, supra note 97, at 527. 
For an extensive discussion see Plant, supra note 97; Buzan, supra note 
106. 
negotiation of the IAEA assistance and notification conventions.l18 The methods 
chosen by the chairmen were informal consultation, informal negotiation in an open- 
ended contact group, and an exchange of views on the basis of draft text followed 
by negotiation of specific texts in special negotiation groups. The negotiations 
resulted in - as already mentioned before - the speedy adoption of the two 
conventions by consensus in September 1986 and the subsequent entry into force of 
both instruments within half a year. 
In the last few years we see another development, namely from official conference 
diplomacy towards policy making diplomacy. Contacts between the governments, or 
their civil servants, take place directly and more or less continuously. This is 
consistent with the expectations on the basis of the theory of complex 
interdependence as described in the second chapter. Multilateral conferences will 
perform another function in these situations. They will be used to formally confirm 
the consensus that has been emerged in these preliminary exchanges, or in order to 
break political deadlocks. 
The actual work will be done outside conference centres. Modem communication 
techniques of course will play an enormous role in this. This development is 
probably closely related to the fact that the international dimension has become a 
standard aspect of policy preparation and implementation in national ministries. 
The preparation of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution is 
an example. Another point in case is the Ozone Convention and its ~ r o t o c o l s . ~ ~ ~  
43. Conclusion to chapter IV 
In this chapter we examined briefly two aspects of international policy change. They 
do not, on first sight, seem to be too closely related to each other, but if one 
takes a closer look at international policy making processes - legal as well as 
political - it will become clear that they are different aspects of the same issue. 
Supra note 8, at 131-132; See also Mautner-Markhof, supra note 62. 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of The Ozone Layer (Vienna, 22 
March 1985), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987). Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987, entered into force on 1 
January 1989), rephted in 26 I.L.M. W1 (1987). See, e.g., Lang, Diplomafie 
zwischen dkonomie und dkologie; Das Beispiel des Ownvertnrgs von Monmal, 43 
Europa-Arcbiv 105-110 (1988); Doniger, Politics of the Owne Layer, 1988 Issues in 
Science and Technology 86-92. 
Public policy analysis, an advanced scientific discipline in domestic policy 
making, offers interesting concepts as a point of departure for international policy 
analysis. This is a discipline that did not yet get much attention in international 
studies. The increasing complexity of the system of international relations, however, 
necessitates creative new (scientific) approaches. Policy analysis might be one of 
these. This is certainly the case if one tries to describe the international (legal) 
system in terms of systems analysis. 
I admit that international policy making presently is still in a first stage of 
development. 'Coexistence concepts' like absolute state sovereignty determine the 
greater part of the actual content of international politics. 'Cooperation concepts'- 
among others a functional state sovereignty and a more important role of 
international organizations - have not yet been widely. accepted as a basis for the 
creation of new regimes. Nevertheless, awareness of elements that are important for 
the understanding changes within (sub)systems or across (sub)systems - especially 
the distinction between Core Aspects and Secondary Aspects - is essential for an 
adequate interpretation of current events, like for example the apparent changes in 
the attitudes of the socialist countries to international cooperation. 
This also has consequences for the analysis of the international legal system. 
One element of this is the process in which international law is formulated. We 
have seen some developments in international conference techniques. This is one 
aspect of modern international law making. New methods in international diplomacy 
might provide new opportunities for the acceptance of legal instruments forming the 
basis of international regimes. Especially with respect to the acceptance of basic 
principles, the development of a common value orientation, these new methods might 
be of importance. 
Of course, the current problems like transboundary air pollution will not be 
solved through the acceptance of certain discussion techniques, on the basis of new 
institutional arrangements, or with the help of public policy analysis. The point is, 
however, that the study of these aspects is important in order to understand 
current changes and perhaps to influence future developments. Moreover, the linkage 
of these issues might provide fiesh perspectives on, for example, the role of 
international law in world society. 
5.1. Fadlitating international ampemtian; the use of models 
At the end of this study I would like to return to the question that initiated this 
exercise: How can international computer models like RAINS be successfully used in 
international negotiations? Or, more specific: What are the difficulties in having a 
scientific model such as RAINS being accepted for use in international negotiations 
and how are these di£ficulties to overcome? 
In the preceding chapters I have tried to give a description of the process and 
structure of international law making and international decision making which can 
form a as a basis for an assessment of the use of RAINS. However, this provided 
only a few elements necessary for a comprehensive answer to the above mentioned 
questions. Detailed research on the building and application of computer models in 
the context of policy formulation or law making is also necessary.120 
Furthermore, exact knowledge is necessary of the negotiation situation in which 
the computer model is to be used. What is the exact subject matter of negotiation, 
who are the negotiators, what positions do they represent, what are their main 
problems, is there any external pressure on them?121 For a specific answer to these 
questions, much more research is needed. All I will .try to do at this place is to 
relate some of the general aspects discussed in this study to the situation in which 
RAINS is supposed to be used. 
We can take the framework discussed in paragraph 4.1. as a point of departure. 
Especially the distinction made between 'deep (normative) core' beliefs, 'near 
(policy) core' beliefs, and 'secondary aspects' can be helpful. The likelihood of the 
occurrence of policy oriented learning depends on the kind of changes that are 
envisaged. This varies from a change in the 'secondary aspects' to the 'normative 
core' changes. The last kind of changes is unlikely to be the result of the use of 
computer models. As we have seen, these kind of changes are mainly to be expected 
lrn See, e.g., L.C. Braat & W.FJ van Lierop, Economic-Ecological Modeling 
(1987); Caldwell, Ganison Diversion: Constraints on Conflict Resolution, 24 Natural 
Resources Journal 839-863 (1984): W.H. Dutton & K.L. Kraemer, Modeling as 
Negotiating; The Political Dynamics of Computer Models in the Policy Process 
(1985); P.W. House, The Art of Public Policy Analysis: The Arena of Regulations and 
Resources (1982); Jacobson, Scientific Research, Risk Assesment, and Policy 
Development, in P. Mandelbaum (ed), supm note 68, at 191; Macbeth, Modeling in 
the Conttaf of Lmu, in Ecosystem Modeling in Theory and Practice: An Introduction 
with Case Histories 197-207 (C.A.S. Hall & J.W. Day Jr. eds. 1977'); Williams, Models 
as Tools for Abatement Strategies - Air Quality Management Approach, in T. 
Schneider (ed), supm note 68, at 265-279. 
12' C' the game approach followed by Mermet & Hordijk, On Getring 
Simulation Models Used in International Negotimonons; A Debriej7ng Exexise, U S A ,  
unpublished paper, 1988. 
as the result of external events. It is, as far as the use of computer models is 
concerned, therefore better to concentrate on changes in the Policy Core and the 
Secondary Aspects of the belief system. 
In the context of environmental law making this means concentrating on the 
elaboration of rules, like emission standards and .on devising mechanisms for 
effective control on international obligations. (Scientific) information is often 
regarded in this process as a neutral ground for agreement which can free the path 
for trading off legitimate differences in i n t e r e ~ t s . ~  The negotiation process on 
most environmental issues in which a growing amount of scientific information has 
to be dealt with, is therefore often seen as "an exercise in joint learning to reach 
common understandings and eventual so~ut ions" .~  
"Negotiators must argue the merits of their cases, but they don't know the 
physical facts. There is a need for some mutual learning. How do they learn 
together and still protect their own interests? That is the beauty of the 
problem."124 
Computers can play a role in dealing with this information in many different ways. 
Nyhart and Goeltner make a distinction behveen four primary functions and three 
significant characteristics of computer models designed to be used in 
negotiations.lZ Pattern Seeking Models are the first group, focussing on the 
analysis of complex past cases with common characteristics, in order to identrfy 
patterns useful to decision makers. They are retrospective and static in character. 
The second group concerns Simulation Models. The primary goals of these models is 
the representation in a real way the subject environment or situation. This enables 
parties to play "what if" situations and to test how different variables affect 
outcomes. A third group consists of so called Assessment Models. These are aimed 
primarily at estimating or judguig the value or character of alternatives from among 
series of several choices. Often these models are subject to substantial uncertainty 
about the value of choices. The fourth group are the Solution Seeking Models. 
These are optimization models. They select the most suitable outcome on the basis 
122 J. Linnerooth, Negotiated River Basin Management; Implementing the Danube 
Declaration @ASA Working Paper WP-88-4,1988); See also Mermet & Hordijk, Id. 
Linnerooth, supra note 122, at 28; See d o ,  chapters 1 & 2 supra. 
H. RaBa (1984) p.45, cited by Linnerooth, supra note 122, at 28. 
lZ J.D. Nyhart & Ch. Goeltner, Computer Models as Support for Complex 
Negotiations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 1987. 
of pre-stated decision or solution criteria. Rule based decision support system 
models are an example of this category. 
The three significant characteristics which are useful in the understanding of 
models in negotiation situations are: (1) the difference between 'context' and 
'process' models. Context models deal mainly with the subject matter of negotiation 
(e.g. effects of the emission of air pollutants), whereas process models concern the 
dynamics and the structure of the negotiation. The number of actors and their 
relationship are among the major parameters of the latter category. (2) The 
distinction between descriptive and prescriptive models.. In prescriptive models actors 
get normative information, while descriptive models provide an analytic program for 
a better understanding of the dynamic of events. (3) The third characteristic refers 
to the role parties play in building the model (is this a joint process of all parties 
involved, or a ready made program?) and the intention of the model (Is it assumed 
to support all negotiating parties, i.e. is it to provide neutral information, or just 
one party?)m 
This list of functions and characteristics is an indication of the wealth of 
factors one has to take into account when assessing the use of a certain model. 
This also can serve as a legitimization of the approach followed in this study. If 
one tries to develop a model to be used in international (environmental) 
negotiations, it is of great importance to have at least a relatively clear picture not 
only of the problems involved but also of negotiation structures and processes. 
Establishing an environmental regime involves more than reaching agreement on the 
formulation of norms for the emission of pollutants or the acceptance of standards 
for legal liability. It is without doubt that computer models can play an important 
role in the solution of these latter aspects of international negotiations. However, 
without the basis of an international (legal) regime, founded on a common value 
orientation, these models will not be able to break political deadlocks in 
negotiations.127 Too much optimism about their role in this kind of situations is not 
realistic. 
See d o ,  Mermet & Hordijk, supra note 121, Linnerooth, supra note 122, 
Sebenius, supm note 92; Sebenius, Negotiah'on Arithmic, 37 International 
Organization 281-316 (1983); J.K. Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea (1984). 
127 Cf. the negotiations on a deep seabed mining regime in UNCLOS ID. Here 
the MIT computer model was successfully used to overcome the deadlock in the 
negotations on a formula for profit sharing. The idea of sharing profits, however, 
had already been accepted in principle by the parties concerned. See Sebenius, supra 
note 92, at 80. 
The RAINS might become, for example, a useful tool for the "linkages 
on a regional scale between the costs of controlling emissions and environmental 
effects [which] can result in more optimal use of funds in addressing problems such 
as the long range transport of pollutants and regional acidification in ~ u r o ~ e " ~ ~ ,  
but in my view only after the principle of shamg costs and benefits has been 
accepted. I am not very optimistic about the impact of this kind of computer 
induced information on the actual decision to transfer of from western to eastern 
Europe. Of course, once the decision has been taken to transfer funds, these models 
can give guidance to the amount i n v o l ~ e d . ~  Hordijk is right when he contends 
that 
"augmenting scientific information wiU not necessarily lead to the 
identification of suitable policies for controlling acidification of the 
environment. This information must be structured in a form that can be used 
for decision making to create a policy based on credible judgements about the 
probability of future events."131 
This can only be effective in a situation of mature policy making. International 
policy making is not yet in such a state of development. It is still in a &st phase 
of development.U2 This does not mean that the building of scientific models is not 
a useful exercise. The point is that their use is limited in situations in which the 
actors do not share certain basic values, or in other words where an international 
regime still has to be developed. In the case of the management of the international 
environment much remains to be done in this respect. 
The ECE provides a promising framework for the development of such a regime. 
It offers an institutional basis for the development of rules and control mechanisms 
once on a high level of decision making, agreement is reached on fundamental 
For an extensive description see Alcamo et al., supra note 61. 
R. Shaw, Transboundary Acidification in Europe and the Benefits of 
International Cooperation 8 (Paper presented at the conference 'Pollution Knows no 
Frontiers: Priorities for Pan-European Cooperation', ~ a r n i  16 - 20 October 1988). 
* Id. 
13' Hordijk, Linking Policy and Science: A Model Approach to Acid Rain, 30 
Environment 17 (1988). 
132 Perhaps it is in this context possible to draw a parallel between the use 
of computer models in the European Communities as tools for implementing 
European Community law, for example on the issue of safety regulation. In this 
situation, computer models can be used in a situation in which international law and 
policy malang is (fully) accepted, and in which rules can, for example, be enforced 
through legal action. 
principles. Building computer models will hardly influence the decision makers at 
this level, as can be concluded from the slow process of the adoption of insufficient 
measures taken until now, but will become of utmost importance for the elaboration 
of a European environmental management regime once agreement can be reached on 
the principles, leaving aside the question what kind of catastrophe (or perhaps 
sudden rational insight) can lead to such decisions. 
5 2  Systems adyskandintenoatianallaw 
Is there any future for systems analysis as a methodology for international legal 
research? I think that this is not the case if one tries to limit system analysis to 
strict juridical issues. The dynamics of international processes, which is the subject 
of a systems analysis of the international legal system, cannot be understood on the 
basis of legal research and reasoning only. A multidisciplinary effort is necessary. 
I have tried to engage in such an effort in this study. The application of 
systems analysis to the development of an international environmental management 
regime showed that such a multidisciplinary approach does provide many challenging 
starting points for further research, not only with regard to environmental issues, 
but also other issues in international relations which are characterized by a high 
degree of interdependence. In these areas international cooperation and international 
(legal) regime building require creative solutions on the basis of new principles or 
values. Systems analysis certainly helps to identify elements that are of importance 
of finding these solutions. 
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